THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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SIGNS OF THE TIMES

Lord Halifax on Canonical Obedience.

The following definition of canonical obedience given by Lord Halifax at the recent annual meeting of the seventy-third anniversary of the English Church Union deserves serious attention, as it is undoubtedly the definition of canonical obedience which is held by the bulk of ordinands to-day who promise at their ordination to obey their bishop 'in all things lawful and honest.'

The venerable President of the English Church Union writes :

> 'Canonical Obedience means obedience to the bishop when administering the Canon Law. It does not mean obedience to the bishop when issuing any commands he likes : not even obedience to the bishop when administering the ecclesiastical law of Parliament, but obedience to the bishop when administering the Canon Law of the Church.'

Lord Halifax expanded his declaration by adding :

> 'It is at least abundantly clear that there has been no formal repudiation of the Canon Law by the Church of England, and so far as she claims to be an integral part of the Catholic Church, the Church of England and the English episcopate are still bound by it. It would seem, therefore, impossible for the bishops to claim "canonical obedience" to the rubrics of the Prayer Book of 1928, which makes permission to reserve the Blessed Sacrament a special favour in exceptional circumstances, and prohibits all outward acts of adoration to the Presence of our Lord in the Sacrament reserved.'

This is a very old plea by Lord Halifax.* Thirty-four years ago, in September, 1898, Lord Halifax, in an address to the

* See *Life and Letters of William Boyd-Carpenter* by H. D. A. Major (Murray), pp. 45-47.

English Church Union during the Church Congress week at Bradford, declared:

> 'The right of Reservation does not rest upon rubrics and the universal custom of the Church alone: it is expressly ordered by the canons of the Church of England. The Canons of the Convocation of Canterbury, known as Archbishop Peckham's Constitutions, ordered all parish priests to reserve on Sundays. Those canons have never been repealed, but, on the contrary, received first force in Henry VIII's reign in 1534, and are part of the Canon Law to which the Church of England is bound. It is necessary to remember this when the question is not whether a canon which has fallen into disuse shall be *enforced*, but of forbidding what it expressly prescribes.'

The President of the Bradford Church Congress (Bishop Boyd Carpenter) immediately wrote to the greatest living Canonists in the Church of England—Bishop William Stubbs, the constitutional historian, and Sir Lewis Dibden, Dean of the Arches—who replied as follows:

THE PALACE, CUDDESDON, OXFORD.
October 11, 1898.

MY DEAR BISHOP,

The Constitution of 1279 very distinctly orders and lays down rules for Reservation of the Eucharist. But we always hold that the rule of the Prayer Book that what is left of the consecrated elements shall be consumed before the priest and his communicants leave the church, abrogates the previously existing custom: the words 'it shall not be carried out of the church' seems to be a flat prohibition of the 'carrying' to the sick, with any amount of due reverence. The Submission of the Clergy and the legislation consequent upon it forbid the execution of any canons or like acts, contrary to the Laws, Statutes, and Customs of the Realm, which are for our present purpose represented by the Prayer Book and Act of Uniformity.

Of course, the Constitution of Peckham was not *totidem verbis* repealed at any time, but it certainly comes into the class of canons which are forbidden by the Statute of 1534; and I do not see how it can be called 'an unrepealed' canon, in any legal or constitutional sense.

Yours ever,
W. OXON.

P.S.—Peckham says: 'We decree also that this sacrament be carried with due reverence to the sick.' The Rubric says: 'It shall not be carried out of Church': explicit enough.

15 OLD SQUARE, LINCOLN'S INN, W.C.
October 12, 1898.

MY DEAR LORD BISHOP,

I think the answer to Lord Halifax's point which he repeats in the *Times* to-day is that under 25 Henry VIII, Ch. 19, s. 7, only 'such canons . . . already made which be not contraryant nor repugnant to the laws, statutes, and customs, of this realm . . .' are still in force. Peckham's *Constitution*, of which I enclose a copy from Johnson's *Ecclesiastical Laws*, Vol. II, is contrarient to the rubric in the Prayer Book as to consumption of the elements left over after a Communion,

and the Prayer Book not only has the force of statute law through the Acts of Uniformity, but had the assent of Convocation, so that Peckham's *Provincial* canon has been repealed by the action of the Provincial Synods themselves.

The 28th Article is not perhaps quite so decisive, because it may be read simply in a negative way, *e.g.* 'Christ's Ordinance is *silent* as to reservation,' etc.

But apart from special enactment as to reservation, is not the answer that the Canon of Peckham is gone because the doctrine that underlay it and made it reasonable is no longer the doctrine of the Church of England?

Yours very truly,

LEWIS T. DIBDEN.

There has been no legal decision since to the contrary.

FOURTEEN ANSWERS TO TWO QUESTIONS ON RELIGION.

The Editor of *To-day and To-morrow* in his Summer Number propounds the two following questions: (1) Is Christianity still a vital force? (2) Do we need a new religion? and publishes fourteen answers to them.

The Jesuit, Fr. D'Arcy, replies: 'I do not like the questions,' but undertakes to answer them, and as might be expected expresses the view that the Roman Catholic form of the Christian Religion is very much alive. He writes:

'It is comforting to see that both in England and still more abroad so many of the keenest intellects and noblest souls are returning home to their patrimony in the Catholic Faith, which Europe has been punished for deserting.'

Fr. Martindale, another Jesuit, voices the same optimistic note. He writes:

'Catholics find they cannot build or enlarge churches fast enough. They observe, too, that religious people do not make a noise about it, whereas people who would like religion to be dying out administer "the suggestion" that it is doing so, or, like Russians, try to make it do so.

'People are certainly puzzled about true religion, often never having come in contact with it: but every class of man (I find) responds to it when offered—in dock or stoke-hold, Army or Air Force camp, doctors, lawyers, prize-fighters and even dons, the least promising material of any.'

Mr. C. E. M. Joad, an obviously tough don, writes:

'The influence of the churches, in my view, will continue to wane, congregations to diminish and recruits for the ministry to fall off. . . This decline is largely, but not wholly, due to the fact that the churches will insist on teaching dogmas which the age has outgrown and "truths" which science has shown to be untrue. . .

'Religion [in contrast to the churches] is still a force and likely to remain so, since it satisfies a deep-seated need of man's nature. I

doubt, however, whether adult human beings will be likely to demand institutions to organise for them the expression of what is a purely private and personal emotion arising from the soul's relation to another order of reality.'

Lord Hugh Cecil judges the two questions to be in some measure misconceived. He writes:

'There seems to underlie those questions the most erroneous opinion that religion ought to be popular, and, if it be true, will be popular. This is quite unsound.'

Does Lord Hugh draw the inference, popular enough in certain religious circles, that a religion, in proportion as it is true, will be unpopular? We judge not. He holds merely that the truth of a religion cannot be tested by its popularity or by its unpopularity. This seems to us to be a fallacious half-truth. The saying *vox populi vox Dei* states the other half. The rabbis had a saying 'With whomsoever the spirit of man is pleased, the Spirit of God is pleased, and with whomsoever the spirit of man is displeased, the Spirit of God is displeased.' There is a universal heart of man which is won by the appeal of truth: again, there is a perverse, prejudiced, obtuse human heart which does not respond. Christ's saying about 'the narrow way' and the few travellers on it refers to contemporary and local conditions, and is not, as it is often wrongly interpreted to be, of universal and eternal validity. The Divine Word in man's heart, which is the essential substance of human nature, must, ultimately, respond to the Divine Word which appeals to it from outside itself. In that case, popularity of the profounder kind will be a proof of true religion.

Kenneth Ingram, the editor of the *Green Quarterly*, alleges that the religious instinct has probably never been stronger among men and women than to-day, but it is less of a vital force. This is due to the failure of the Churches to organize it. He confesses that:

'To-day orthodoxy counts for little, compared with the rights of individual happiness and freedom . . . Men and women were never more in sympathy with Christ than now. The task of the Church is to discover how this sympathy can be made the basis of a community.'

Dr. Garvie, a great Free Church teacher, agrees with the Jesuit Fathers in being thoroughly optimistic. He writes:

'The most potent factor in human progress is the Christian religion . . . The leaders of the churches are more alive than those of

any previous generation to the needs of the hour . . . It is, in its moral code, slowly recognising that changed social conditions involve changes in the formulation of ethical principles.'

The Rev. James Reed, President of the National Free Church Council, affirms that:

'People are coming to see that without some source of spiritual light and power, we are bankrupt, and cannot successfully deal with the resultant chaos.'

This view is also voiced by the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, who writes:

'The world if it is to remain civilised needs religion, just as much as it needs art and science — rather more, in fact. The world, too, seems to be quite widely conscious of this need for religion . . . I am convinced that if the churches could manage to overcome their extreme distrust of religious change, the chief obstacle to religious vitality and growth would be removed.'

Dr. Horton, the Nestor of the Free Churches, writes:

'So far as I can judge, the response to Christ is now on the increase. And what is sometimes called "the decay of religion" is the decay of the pseudo-religious forces and institutions that keep them from Him.'

Dr. Horton's verdict is also that of Dr. Burroughs, Bishop of Ripon, who declares that:

'Never has the Christian "way of salvation" been more clearly indicated on so vast a stage by the results of not accepting it.'

Mr. Middleton Murry believes that the *crux* of the present situation is to discover the message of Christianity, which for him is 'to love my neighbour as myself.' The pressing duty which faces Christianity is to become itself. We cannot agree with Mr. Murry, much as we admire him, that Christianity is identical with philanthrophy. Jesus Himself certainly put the duty of loving God first, and it is only as we love God rightly that we shall love man rightly.

Sir Francis Younghusband replies with enthusiasm and greets the unknown with a cheer. He holds that all that Christianity needs is to be 're-presented' again and again until the new spirit which comes into the world with Christ transforms *homo sapiens* into *homo mysticus*. Sir Francis believes that it is within the power of England 'to be to the nations of the world what Christ is to individual men and women.' England will be 'the Messiah nation, the Christ country. She will lead the way to a spiritual community of nations and a new world.'

BLESSING THE IRISH EUCHARISTIC CONGRESS.

The Guardian of June 24 has perturbed some of its readers by its benediction pronounced on the Dublin Eucharistic Congress. 'All Christians must wish for blessings on that Congress,' is the declaration of the editor. We wonder why.

It is true that the Gospel bids Christians bless their enemies and persecutors, but surely this command does not require us to bless (that is, pray God to grant prosperity and success to) their principles and methods. A primitive Christian was bound, as a Christian, to pray for a Pagan persecuting Emperor that God would guard him, guide him, and grant him salvation, but surely not to pray that the Emperor's persecution of the Church and the propagation of Pagan idolatry should be crowned with success.

We have unfortunately to recognize that Romanism is one of the most fruitful causes of a materialist and intolerant secularism which flourishes in all countries where Romanism has been supreme. It is that imperialist spirit and policy which so markedly differentiates the religion of Rome from the religion of Christ.

One of Rome's most flamboyant methods of propaganda today takes the form of Eucharistic Congresses. These Congresses propagate a doctine of the Eucharist which we who are members of the Reformed Church cannot forget some of our ablest bishops were burnt alive for contradicting. The Roman doctrines of the Miracle of the Mass and the Expiatory Sacrifice of the Mass are as repugnant as they are incredible to the modern mind. By repelling many educated people from organized Christianity and leading many simple people into gross superstition they do a serious injury to the influence of the Christian religion. How is it possible conscientiously to pray that God will bless a gathering which seeks to propagate such things?

We may not feel, as did our Reforming ancestors, that it is a duty to attack Roman error and superstition on every occasion. We shall probably think that by assisting the rising tide of education and by positively promoting moral and spiritual religion we shall best check and in the end abolish religious error. Mean-

while, as clear-headed and honest men, we had better abstain from blessing Romanism unless we mean something quite contrary to what we seem to say, as in the Jacobite toast :

> 'God bless the King, God bless our Faith's Defender,
> God bless, no harm in blessing the Pretender;
> But which Pretender is and which is King,
> God bless us all is quite another thing.'

Three Questions to Clericalists.

Some stir has been caused in Church circles in the North of England by a trenchant article in the *Yorkshire Post* by Lieut.-Colonel E. N. Mozley, a great-nephew of Cardinal Newman.

Colonel Mozley, criticizing the clericalism exhibited in the recent debates in the Lower House of the Canterbury Convocation, asserts that the vast majority of English laymen are against the attitude of that body. He puts the three following questions to English clericalists :

> (1) Do the clergy imagine, in the present state of economics and of distribution of population, that married folk will accept the clerical alternatives of large families or the ascetic life?
>
> (2) Do they imagine that the laity will agree to innocent divorcés being given the alternative of perpetual celibacy or excommunication?
>
> (3) Do they think that the laity of the Church feel themselves in things spiritual to be nearer to Old Catholics or the Eastern Church than they are to Presbyterians or Wesleyans?

There is no doubt as to the way in which the vast majority of the English laity are answering these questions. They are in agreement with Col. Mozley. This means that if the clericalist policy prevails within the English Church there will be no one left in a generation or so in that body except a handful of clericalist laity to support the clericalist clergy. This clericalizing temper has been steadily increasing in influence within the English Church since the rise of the Oxford Movement and has grown in expulsive power with the century. It has succeeded in that period in alienating some fifty per cent. of the English laity, and it has enormously increased the forces of indifference and even hostility to the Church of England. We do not deny that a number of good results have come into our Church life with the Oxford Movement, but unless it can laicize its spirit and liberalize its outlook our Church is doomed to sterility and extinction.

The Innocent Party.

For many years the Church of England by its strenuous and futile opposition to the marriage of the Deceased Wife's Sister lowered its public reputation for good sense and sound judgment in matrimonial matters. Its present attitude towards the re-marriage of the Innocent Party is creating a growing conviction among sober citizens that the Church is hopelessly prejudiced and callously unjust.

It is true that the Innocent Party in a divorce case may not always be innocent, but the Church has to accept the decision of the Civil Courts in this matter, as it does in all others. It is not in a position to re-try these matrimonial cases, and Christian charity demands, as does the English law, that every person shall be regarded and treated as innocent until proved guilty.

The unjust and oppressive efforts being made by a number of English ecclesiastics to deprive the Innocent Party of his or her legal rights, is regarded by many of the laity as proving the existence of a spirit of lawlessness in the Church which is subversive of her moral influence with the nation.

The Marriage Reform League in a recently published leaflet criticizes the Church authorities severely on this account.

> The ecclesiastical mind has been distinguishing itself lately by its treatment of the innocent party in a divorce suit. He is not to be married in church, and is not to be admitted to Holy Communion except by special permission of the bishop. The ball was set rolling by the Lambeth Conference, which followed slavishly a canon of the Episcopal Church of the United States of America. The Archbishop of Canterbury followed suit in counselling his diocese against the remarriage of the innocent party; in doing this he was acting consistently with the line he took up as a member of the Royal Commission on Marriage and Divorce. And quite recently a Committee of the Lower House of the Convocation of Canterbury has decided that the innocent party should not be allowed the 'lesser privilege' of remarriage, and therefore not the 'greater privilege' of admission to Holy Communion.
>
> When the ordinary right feeling Churchman reads of these declarations, his first impulse is to ask what is the law on this matter. He knows that his church is the Established Church, and is therefore subject to the King's ecclesiastical law, and possibly he does not know what this is. In any case he finds it difficult to believe that bishops, whose most outstanding function is to see that the clergy obey the law, can be supposed to order disobedience to the law.
>
> The law of this Church and Realm in this matter is contained in the Judicature (Consolidation) Act, 1925 (15 & 16 Geo. V, c. 49), s. 184 :—

'As soon as any decree for divorce is made absolute, either of the parties to the marriage may, if there is no right of appeal against the decree absolute, marry again as if the prior marriage had been dissolved by death, or, if there is such a right of appeal, may so marry again, if no appeal is presented against the decree, as soon as the time for appealing has expired, or, if an appeal is so presented, as soon as the appeal has been dismissed.'

Then there follows a clause defining the rights and duties of the clergy :—

'No clergyman of the Church of England shall be compelled to solemnize the marriage of any person whose former marriage has been dissolved on the ground of his or her adultery, or shall be liable to any proceedings, penalty or censure for solemnizing or refusing to solemnize the marriage of any such person.'

Then, following hard on this last clause, a singular provision was made to safeguard at once the right of the layman to be married in church and to consider tenderly the consciences of the clergy :—

'If any minister of any church or chapel of the Church of England refuses to perform the marriage service between any persons who but for his refusal would be entitled to have the service performed in that church or chapel, he shall permit any other minister of the Church of England entitled to officiate within the diocese in which the church or chapel is situate to perform the marriage service in that church or chapel.'

Over against this plain recognition of the rights of the laity and the duties of the clergy, we have the Lambeth Conference recommending 'that the marriage of one, whose former partner is still living, should not be celebrated according to the rites of the Church.' And not only did the Archbishop of Canterbury ban the innocent party, but the Bishops of Peterborough, Winchester, Salisbury and Chichester followed suit; and as no other bishop has protested publicly against the defiance of the law, the assumption must be made that the secret conclave at Lambeth Palace is behind the attempt to override the law. One bishop, however, has been wise enough to refuse to interfere in a case of remarriage—the Bishop of St. Edmundsbury and Ipswich, and in so acting he said :—

'I find it difficult to distinguish the status of parties after divorce lawfully pronounced and the status brought about by the death of one of the parties, where the right to marry again is not questioned, even if the conduct of the person desiring to re-marry had been bad enough to contribute towards the death of the former partner.'

The latest phase of illegal clericalist oppression is the refusal by clergymen to publish the banns of marriage of any divorced person. In this they are acting illegally, for if a person is entitled legally to re-marriage in church, he is entitled to the incidentals of such a marriage.

The law-abiding clergy find themselves in a very difficult position in this matter.

> 'If they refuse the bishops' counsel and act on the law, they are branded as bad Churchmen; if, on the other hand, they follow the bishops, they become law-breakers and liable at any moment to a censure by the High Court. Do the bishops realize the violence they are doing to the conscience of many of the clergy, who condemn the lawless advice given but do not feel they are called on to disregard it? Or have they considered the widespread resentment of good laymen who are having their rights filched from them, knowing all the time that, though they could have those rights vindicated by the High Court, yet are unwilling to be put to the cost in time and temper which an appeal to the Court would involve?'

We could wish that those bishops, who are not in favour of this clericalist policy, would at the earliest possible date publicly express their dissent from it.

The *Solicitor's Journal* spoke recently for the layman when it wrote :—

> 'The bishops still appear to live in a mediaeval atmosphere of their own, and, while they do so, cannot justly complain if young people respect neither them nor their doctrines.'

Many reflecting people of goodwill are asking why the Church is losing influence with the great body of Englishmen. There are many reasons for that, but one at least is the attitude of its more vocal elements on the marriage and divorce question.

There is urgent need of reform in our marriage and divorce law, but unfortunately this reactionary section of our Church, misled by a fundamentally wrong conception of the character of Christ's teaching, and by an ill-balanced admiration for the Canon Law of the mediaeval Latin Church, is opposing reforms which commend themselves to the Christian consciousness of the bulk of the nation, who, believing whole-heartedly in marriage as a life-long monogamous union, do not believe in enforcing this ideal by methods which reflect the spirit of legalistic Pharisaism rather than the insight, tenderness and love of Christ.

THE VALUE OF PRAYER IN THE LIGHT OF MODERN SCIENCE

By the Rev. E. C. Dewick, M.A.

THERE is a widespread feeling to-day that there is something unscientific and old-fashioned about prayer; and that the value of prayer has been discredited by the discoveries of modern science. At most, it is admitted that prayer may be of some subjective value to the person who prays, by creating in his own mind an atmosphere of quietness, and by strengthening his will to choose the right; but the idea that prayer can have any objective influence on the course of events outside the mind of the devotee is generally dismissed as an outworn superstition.

Now prayer has, as a matter of fact, been an important element in almost every type of religion; and indeed, a religion entirely devoid of prayer would scarcely be a religion at all. It is true that in some forms of Buddhism there does seem to be no logical place left for prayer; but the very history of Buddhism goes to show how difficult it is to maintain the exclusion of prayer in its completeness, and how persistently prayer finds its way back into the popular forms of religion. The simple Buddhist devotee, prostrate before an image in the Buddhist shrine, is obviously praying to and petitioning an unseen power, with as much simplicity and fervour as can be found in any other religion.

We are not, of course, suggesting that prayer, in the higher forms of religion, should consist exclusively, or even predominantly, of petition. True prayer consists of *a spiritual communion between the spirit of man and some higher spiritual power or powers*; and such communion must include the elements of 'listening,' thanksgiving, and the expression of worship and love, as well as the element of petition. Even in the case of intercourse between two human persons, there can be little progress towards real mutual understanding and communion as long as one of the parties occupies the whole time with petitions, and shows no disposition either to listen to the other in quietness, or to express gratitude and affection; and this is no less true in the case of communion between the spirit of man and the Spirit of God.

Moreover, in so far as petition does form an element in prayer, it will not be in the form of petition that God may be persuaded to act in accordance with our wishes; but rather that our wills may be so harmonized with the greater will of God that we may be enabled to co-operate with Him in His plans. In prayer, however, as in most aspects of religion, there has often been a danger that the lower elements should come into the foreground and attract a notice far beyond their deserts; and so it is not uncommon to find that the popular impression of prayer is that it consists primarily in asking God to do for us certain things that *we* desire, or even in persuading God to change His mind and His plan in order to accede to our wishes. This is a serious misunderstanding of what prayer really is; but it is a misunderstanding that is very widespread, and is partly responsible for the idea that the value of prayer is disproved by modern thought and modern science. If prayer were nothing more than this kind of selfish petition, it would indeed be difficult to harmonize it with the best thought either of science or religion; but prayer, in the true Christian sense, is the spiritual communion and intercourse of human children with their Divine Father. Such prayer will bring into action many elements of our being; it will demand the attention of our wills, the gratitude and worship of our emotions, and the best judgment of our intelligence and reason. Only when these have all been employed are we in a position to add petition to our prayers, and to expect that such petition will not be valueless. Is not this clearly indicated by the 'pattern of prayer' set before us by Christ in the Lord's Prayer, in which He teaches us to think first of the great causes associated with God's plan—His Name, His Kingdom, His Will—before we turn our attention to those things which *we* desire, our daily bread, and our salvation. '*Thy Will be done*' must always precede '*Give us this day our daily bread.*'

It is perhaps hardly necessary to spend much time in the endeavour to show that prayer is of value for the one who prays. The witness to this value is human-wide. From devout souls of every age and race there comes the witness that prayer has brought to them quietness, clear judgment, patience and courage. Not indeed that these blessings have come in every case,

nor as an immediate response; but that they have come on the whole, and in the long run, seems to be clear beyond the possibility of doubt. Even many of those who do not believe in the existence of God admit that prayer has a 'suggestive value' for the worshipper, and that the effort to concentrate the mind upon things that are high and noble has a reflex action on the mind which is ennobling and strengthening. It is, however, rather difficult to suppose that man would long continue the practice of prayer, even if he believed it to be beneficial, if he were convinced that the benefits can only be obtained through concentrating the mind upon an illusion that does not really exist.

But for those who believe in the existence of God as a personal Father, prayer, as communion with God, is a natural and necessary corollary of religion; for if a Father-God is really near us and accessible to us, it is inconceivable that we should not desire to hold spiritual intercourse with Him.

So a belief in the value of prayer would seem to follow logically from a faith in God. The actual practice of prayer, however, does not always follow from such faith; for many who honestly believe in God have noted the strange fact that they find in themselves a curious unwillingness to pray. But they know that for them the obstacle to prayer lies not in the intellect, but in the will. 'What they will, they do not.' One such person said recently to the present writer: 'The difficulties that I find in actually betaking myself to prayer (in spite of my clear and unhesitating belief in its value) sometimes make me think that the Devil must concentrate his energies on preventing people like myself from praying!' In such cases, the intellect and the will have not been fully harmonized; but in the truly converted life, when these have been unified by the Spirit of God, the background of prayer is always an essential part of religion.

There remains, however, the question whether prayer, in addition to conferring benefits on the life of the one who prays, actually has any effect upon the world at large. *Does prayer change the course of events?*

In this connection there are several real difficulties to be faced. In the first place, it may be asked, 'If God is an all-knowing and almighty Father, why should we human beings expect (or desire) that our prayers should change the course of

events? Is it not more natural, and more truly religious, to leave the course of events to God, who knows, far better than we, what is best to be done, and has at His disposal all the necessary powers?'

Now it does not seem to be always realized that this argument cuts away not only the call to *prayer*, but also the call to *action*. If there is no need for us to intervene in anything, our best course is to leave everything well alone. The social reformer stands as much condemned by this test as the saint in his hours of devotion. The most truly 'religious' people are (on this theory) of the kind who are vividly portrayed as the 'goats' in Christ's picture of the Divine Judgment — people of whom no single evil action is recorded, but who abstained from interfering with the course of events, and neither visited the sick, fed the hungry, nor clothed the naked, but 'left things well alone' in each case. To these persons it will be remembered that the Divine Judge is represented as saying: 'Depart, ye cursed, into the everlasting fire!' It would seem, then, that Christ at any rate did not regard the policy of inaction as one which deserves the blessing of God. Moreover, throughout the Bible — Old Testament as well as New — the world is depicted, not as a ship, of which God is the Captain and we are but passengers who have no business to intervene in the ship's management or course, but rather as a battlefield, in which God is indeed the Captain, but we are His soldiers whose duty it is to take an active part in the campaign. In that campaign, both action and prayer are weapons; for indeed true prayer *is* action, and in it there is a real output of energy — invisible, immeasurable, but immense. We can see from the Gospels how Christ Himself was physically and spiritually exhausted after prayer. For Him it involved an immense expenditure of power; and He knew how hard it is 'to pray and not to faint.' So in the great campaign of the Kingdom, God calls upon us to exert ourselves, not only in action but also in prayer. It is only a mistaken view of God's omnipotence which pictures Him as a Dictator allowing no initiative to His subjects.

There remains another difficulty which requires careful consideration. 'Is not the idea that prayer can alter the course of events contrary to what we know of Natural Law, and the in-

evitable sequence of cause and effect in the world of nature?' This objection acquired increasing weight through the researches of science during the nineteenth century. On every hand, the result of these researches seemed to indicate that the whole world is governed by what are usually called 'laws'; *i.e.* by some principle which decides that, given the same antecedents, the same consequences follow with unfailing regularity. The apparent exceptions to this 'reign of law'—exceptions which are commonly known among religious people as 'miracles'—proved again and again, on investigation, to be not real exceptions, but only illustrations of the operation of 'laws' hitherto not observed by man. Again and again, a phenomenon that appeared to be 'miraculous,' such as an eclipse or an earthquake, was found on investigation to be part of a process quite as regular in its own way as the falling of an apple or the daily rising of the sun. Even the apparently supernatural experiences within the mind of man were shown by psychology to be due, in some measure at least, to regular processes of working. Steadily, surely, and inevitably, science seemed to be pushing back the frontiers of the supernatural and the miraculous, so that thoughtful men began to ask themselves whether any territory would finally be left which did not come under the sway of 'natural law.' There were not lacking some among the ranks of scientists—and many more among the ranks of their less educated followers—who hastened to proclaim that science had proved that all life came under the domain of natural law, and that the world is in reality a vast machine, immensely complex, but invariably regular in its working; so that the idea of 'changing the course of events' by prayer is merely an illusion of the religious mind. That idea received expression in the unforgettable lines of Fitzgerald's *Omar Khayyam*:

> 'With earth's first clay They did the last man knead;
> And there of the last Harvest sowed the seed;
> And the first Morning of Creation wrote
> What the last Dawn of Reckoning shall read.'

Or again:

> 'The moving finger writes; and having writ, moves on;
> Nor all your piety and wit
> Can lure it back to cancel half a line,
> Nor all your tears wash out a word of it.'

We cannot fail to admire the stately magnificence of such an

idea, as well as the haunting beauty of its expression in these stanzas. Nevertheless, anyone who has studied the recent trends of scientific thought, particularly during the last ten years, can hardly fail to note that a somewhat different outlook is beginning to find expression in the words and writings of many of the leading scientists to-day. A large number of these are saying quite clearly that the purely 'mechanistic' conception of the universe is not really satisfactory to them, even from the point of view of science, and still less from the point of view of human life and its values.

I think we can indicate at least two causes that have contributed towards this change in the recent trend of scientific thought.

In the first place, it has become clear to all thoughtful men that a rigidly mechanistic view of the universe logically leads us to conclusions which are even more far-reaching than its first advocates realized. Scientists such as Huxley and Haeckel proclaimed confidently that the 'scientific' view of the universe leaves no room for God. Or if there be a God at all, He is in any case as impassive as Huxley's 'Divine Chess-Player, always perfectly just, but never overlooking a mistake,' and against whom man has no chance of winning in the long run, if he pits his strength against the Laws of Nature in the relentless game of life. Such a God, impressive though he may be, is after all no more lovable and no more worshipful than a mechanical *robot*.

Many of the nineteenth century scientists were quite prepared to dispense with God, or to relegate Him into the category of the mechanical, and even proclaimed this as one of their great achievements. But their successors have begun to realize that if the mechanical view of the universe leaves no room for *God*, neither does it leave any room for *man*—or at least for any of those qualities which distinguish man from the rest of the world of nature. For if the world is a pure machine, revolving with unalterable regularity, there can be no place in such a machine for any variations caused by human action, any more than by the acts of God. This means that our own sense of freedom and responsibility, which is absolutely central in the human consciousness, is really an illusion, both in great things and in small. If the world is a closed mechanical system, I am

under an illusion when I imagine that I can in any way alter the course of events; and my illusion is just as untrue to the facts of life whether it is on a grand scale, such as the belief that I have the power to influence the thoughts of other men, and through them (it may be) to change the course of human life and history at large, or whether it be in some small sphere, such as the belief that I have the power to move an object on the table from one spot to another. If the world is a rigid mechanical system, this latter belief is no less untrue than the former; for the movements of my hand are as much pre-determined (on this theory) as the rise and fall of empires.

Now this means that, on the mechanistic view, all our innermost convictions of freedom and responsibility, and the power to judge and to think, are illusions. Man is, in that case, no more free in reality than a stone; and indeed he only differs from a stone because he has this absurd 'illusion of freedom' lodged in his heart.

Moreover, not only is the sense of freedom an illusion, but also the sense of right and wrong. The very words 'good' and 'evil' have no meaning in a pure machine; and all the values of human life are relegated into the realm of the unreal, if we accept a purely mechanistic interpretation of the universe.

This conclusion, relentless and unwelcome as it may seem, is one from which it is surely impossible to escape, if we accept the mechanistic view of life with logical thoroughness. There is no possible justification, on scientific grounds, for saying that the scientific view of the universe forbids us, *a priori*, to believe in the possibility of the free action of *God* upon the world deflecting and modifying the 'natural' course of events, and yet allows us to believe in the reality of similar action on the part of *man*. Science may indeed justify us in saying that, in this or that particular case, the evidence for Divine intervention is not scientifically established; but it cannot, on *a priori* grounds, rule out the possibility of such Divine intervention without excluding the possibility of human intervention, too.

So among recent scientific writers there has been a growing tendency to recognize that the purely mechanistic view of the world inevitably ends in depriving life of all its values, and of all that makes it really worth living; and scientists themselves are

asking the question whether such an interpretation of life is one with which the mind of man can permanently rest satisfied. Hence there has come a greater readiness at least to admit the possibility that some factors which are not covered by the known 'laws' of the natural world are nevertheless factors which really exist, and must be taken account of, in any satisfactory view of the world. Now this leaves the way open for the possibility that prayer may be one of these factors; and forbids us to state dogmatically that the idea of the influence of prayer is 'contrary to science.'

Another line of thought, emanating from within the scientific realm itself, has of late been contributing towards a similar change in the attitude of science towards religion. The challenge to mechanism has not come merely from the side of those who wish to preserve those moral and spiritual values of life for which mechanism, in its extreme form, refuses to allow any place; but also from the ranks of those whose interests have been concentrated on purely scientific experiments.

For it is noteworthy that recent developments of scientific experimentation seem to be suggesting that the universe is after all not so fixed and unalterable as the science of the later nineteenth century seemed to indicate. New discoveries have opened up the existence of spheres in which further investigation has not succeeded in discovering an increasing uniformity, but rather an increasing *irregularity* of action. The study of radium is one of the best known examples of this. Scientists such as Eddington are now suggesting that the appearance of absolute uniformity in the working of Nature is itself in some respects an illusion. It is due, in part at least, to the fact that we are dealing with the elements of life in incredibly vast numbers; and where we deal with vast numbers, we always *seem* to get a tendency towards uniformity, which becomes more and more uniform as the numbers dealt with become greater. For instance, the statistician is able to predict the death-rate in any very large city with tolerable certainty by the 'law of averages.' He is able to know, with very little possibility of error, how many persons will die in a city such as London, or Calcutta, tomorrow. But if he is dealing with a *small section* of that city, it will be much more difficult to predict exactly how many deaths

will occur; and if he is dealing with a single house, then the law of averages will not help him, and he will have no means (apart from the personal investigation of the particular circumstances in the house) of predicting whether a death will or will not occur in that house on a particular day.

Hence we are led to entertain the possibility that the 'impression of uniformity' which we gain from our observation of nature may be more rigid than is warranted by the real facts. And this possibility is confirmed when we remember that our human observations extend over periods that are, even at their longest, very brief, in relation to the whole period of the story of nature.

Let us illustrate this. We may imagine a visitor to this planet from some other sphere, watching the behaviour of a number of city clerks, living in the country and working in city offices, during a long succession of days. He notes that every day they all rise at a particular hour, take the train from their country houses to the city, spend so many hours at their office, return home in the evening, and go to bed at more or less the same time. Each day the same process is repeated; and from this he concludes that human behaviour is purely mechanical, and that human beings have no real freedom of action. Day after day he makes these observations, and each day confirms these conclusions. Finally, he goes back to his own world with a report to this effect, based upon careful and prolonged observation.

But as a matter of fact, if he had stayed a few days longer, he would have found that when the holiday-season came round the apparent regularity of the human specimens that he was observing would have been completely interrupted, and an entirely new and apparently erratic way of life could have been observed.

So it is suggested that the apparent uniformity with which events happen in the world of nature is partly illusory; due on the one hand to the fact that we are here dealing with incredibly large numbers of the primary elements of life, and, on the other hand, that we are dealing with them by observations which extend over a relatively short time. As long as we are dealing with them in these incredibly large numbers, and during rela-

tively short periods, we are able to say with practical certainty that such and such things *will* happen. But the more we analyse the behaviour of small units on the one hand, and prolong our observations at the same time, the more do we find that their behaviour appears uncertain, and that there is no means of predicting precisely how the unit will behave. If the 'atom' of nineteenth century science was thought to be a solid, regularly-behaved object, the 'proton' or the 'electron' of twentieth century science seems to be far less solid, and far more erratic in its behaviour; and science is finding it more and more difficult to predict exactly what it will do, or how it will behave. In other words, science itself seems to be suggesting that the more we analyze the world of nature, the more we find that at the heart of nature there lies, not a rigid law, but something indeterminate, something quite consistent with the idea of freedom. Now if this 'capacity for freedom' is found at the heart of the universe, there seems no reason to deny the possiblity that free acts may have a real place both in the life of man and in the activity of the Supreme Spirit that governs the world.

In other words, while the science of 1892 seemed as if it closed the door to the possibility of prayer as a real factor in life, the science of 1932 leaves that door open. Whether prayer actually is, or is not, such a factor is a matter for legitimate investigation; but at least the science of to-day does not forbid us to undertake that investigation with an open mind, or even with the expectation that it may lead to positive results.

There is, however, one further consideration which needs to be borne in mind, lest in the reaction from a mechanistic view of life we should rush to the other extreme, and assume that all life is irresponsible and irregular. We know that in human life freedom becomes valuable only when it is exercised within a 'framework' of law and order. Without this framework, freedom degenerates into mere anarchy. So when we assert that God, if He is God, must have a measure of freedom, we do not thereby assert that He is irresponsible or erratic; and the orderliness which appears in the world of nature, though it cannot be regarded as so uniform that it excludes all freedom, is nevertheless a revelation of God's methods, as well as being the necessary framework without which the world would be, not a cosmos, but

a chaos. Science, in revealing to us the orderliness of the Laws of Nature, is revealing to us something that is inherent in the mind of God. Above all, in the moral sphere, we cannot think of God as other than reliable and orderly in His maintenance of the great laws of right and wrong.

It is not always easy, or even possible, for us logically to reconcile in our own minds the idea of orderliness with the idea of freedom; but we cannot press either of these thoughts so far as to exclude the other without endangering some element that is vital for a balanced view of life.

So then we may say, on the one hand, that when we are estimating the value of prayer, there is no reason why it should not have the power to modify and change the course of events, so that things will happen as the result of prayer which would *not* have happened if prayer had not been offered.

On the other hand, we should recognize that prayer itself finds its full freedom only within the framework of the great laws of life. To look upon prayer as a private means for upsetting the laws of nature is to conceive of prayer in an unworthy or an immoral way.

Christian prayer, especially, has traditionally always been offered 'in the Name of Christ'; and that means, not merely that a Christian prayer should close with the formula 'through Jesus Christ our Lord,' but also that it must be offered in the *spirit* of Jesus Christ, *i.e.* in harmony with what He has revealed as His Will and God's Will for mankind and the world.

In the light of this, we see that it is impossible for a Christian to pray, for instance, in the name of Christ that God would grant him selfish privileges, in unfair preference to other of his fellowmen who are also children in God's family. Thus a Christian student cannot truly pray in the name of Christ that God will enable him to succeed in an examination, if he has been lazy in preparation for his examination. It is not the purpose of Christian prayer to provide a supernatural compensation for laziness or selfishness. The student may indeed pray for clearness of mind and strength of body to enable him to do his best; but not for any stroke of good luck which would enable him to appear in the eyes of the examiner to have greater knowledge or ability than he usually has.

Similarly, with regard to prayers which might affect the course of natural events. The question is often asked, 'May we pray for fine weather, or for rain?' The scientific and Christian answer surely is that while we do not *a priori* rule out the possibility that prayer may have an influence on the course of nature, we need not expect this to happen merely to gratify our own personal wishes. In such cases, we are dealing with processes which affect not merely ourselves, but vast numbers of other people; and so we need, on Christian grounds, to be very careful lest we should be asking for the welfare of the world at large to be subordinated to our own, like thoughtless children who ask their father, as a head of some great business enterprise, to change the whole working of his business merely in order to please some passing fancy or wish of theirs.

But if we believe that God is Love, then when we pray 'along the lines of love'—*i.e.* when we pray for something which we believe to be in harmony with God's purpose of love for His children—we shall find that in these prayers of ours there is a spiritual dynamic far greater than we can easily understand. We shall find that if we pray for the healing of the sick, there is a power to heal which transcends anything that medical science has yet learnt to explain. When we pray for courage to attempt some hard work, we shall find that mountains of difficulty do, as a matter of fact, vanish away. When we pray that someone whose heart is hard may be softened, or that someone in the grip of sin may be free, we shall find that our prayers effect far more than we do dare to hope. Along such lines as these, experience goes to show that the power of prayer is a real factor in life; and that while it is conditioned to some extent by natural laws, yet within those conditions its range and dynamic far exceeds anything that we had thought of.

In our age, oppressed as it is with the sense of being held down by forces beyond human control—forces which often appear to be heedless of our welfare and blind to any moral purpose in their working—there is perhaps no greater need than the recovery of faith in prayer and of the practice of prayer. If we can recover these, we shall find that Christ's old promise still stands true:

> 'ASK, AND YE SHALL HAVE;
> SEEK, AND YE SHALL FIND;
> KNOCK, AND IT SHALL BE OPENED UNTO YOU.'

ARTHUR HUGH CLOUGH AS A RELIGIOUS TEACHER

By the Rev. Leslie S. Peake, M.A., B.Litt., Author of
'Arthur Samuel Peake: A Memoir.'

APART from Tennyson, there is perhaps no poet in the Victorian era who was more disturbed by the religious problems of his day than Arthur Hugh Clough. In 1848 he resigned his position as Fellow and Tutor at Oriel College rather than deny his religious convictions, and through nearly all his poetry we can trace a search for peace, a longing for rest, which never entirely left him. When he contemplates the clear stars at night he wishes, with 'Dipsychus,' that they could take up his restless being into theirs. When he looks into the stillness of 'A River Pool,' he longs for a similar stillness in his own soul. And when he calls to mind a vessel that has been wrecked at sea, 'sails rent and rudder broken,' it only serves to symbolize the darkness that is in his own soul:

> 'Carrying on the child into the man,
> Nothing into reality.'

Like the writer of the twenty-third Psalm, he longs for the 'green pastures' and the 'still waters,' but like the author of 'In Memoriam,' he only resembles

> 'An infant crying in the night:
> An infant crying for the light:
> And with no language but a cry.'

In this search for peace Clough always realized the necessity of Truth. He could no more have accepted the theological opinions of his Roman Catholic friend, W. G. Ward, than he could have believed in the reality of Don Quixote or Baron Munchausen. For Clough, Truth was of supreme value, and a religion based simply on external authority meant nothing at all. This lofty conception of Truth was derived partly from his mother's teaching, partly from his old headmaster, Dr. Arnold of Rugby, and partly from what lay within his own personality.

It has often been pointed out that many of the world's greatest men, and especially poets, owe a great deal to mothers who,

if little known, were nevertheless clever and talented. Browning, Goethe, Tasso, and Clough are conspicuous examples. In a letter, written by the poet's sister, Clough's debt to his mother is clearly recognized. The letter is taken from the memoir prefixed to *The Poems and Prose Remains*, published in 1869.

> 'She loved what was grand, noble, and enterprising, and was truly religious. She early taught us about God and duty, and having such a loving earthly father, it was not difficult to look up to a Heavenly one. She loved to dwell on all that was stern and noble. Leonidas at Thermopylae, and Epaminondas accepting the lowliest offices and doing them as a duty to his country; the sufferings of the martyrs, and the struggles of the Protestants, were among her favourite subjects. There was an enthusiasm about her that took hold of us, and made us see vividly the things that she taught us. But with this love of the terrible and grand she was altogether a woman, clinging to and leaning on our father. When he left us, Arthur became her pet and her companion. I cannot but think that her love, her influence, and her teaching had much to do with forming his character.'

From the winter of 1822 to the summer of 1828 the family resided at Charleston, and during these early years of the poet's life we are told that he and his mother 'read much together, histories, ancient and modern, stories of the Greek heroes, parts of Pope's Odyssey and Iliad, and much out of Walter Scott's novels.' There is a reference to these happy days at Charleston in a poem that Clough wrote at school. He has been taken ill, and is watching Arnold's younger children at play:

> 'I looked upon thy Children, and I thought of all and each,
> Of my brother and my sister, and our rambles on the beach,
> Of my mother's gentle voice, and my mother's beckoning hand,
> And all the tales she used to tell of the far, far English land.'

The other influence that did so much to mould and strengthen Clough's conception of Truth was that of his old headmaster, Dr. Arnold of Rugby. Clough went to Rugby when he was only ten, and he remained there till he went up to Oxford, so that Arnold's strong personality was felt during the greater part of the boy's life at school. Arnold made it a practice to cultivate the friendship of his older pupils not only in their hours of work but also in their hours of recreation. He strengthened the connexion between master and pupil by making use of the Sixth Form, thus adding greatly to the discipline of the school. The friendship formed between Arnold and Clough was one that lasted till the headmaster's death in 1842.

At Oxford the poet came into contact with the Tractarian Movement. At first he was attracted by its poetry, its enthusiasm, and its ideals. He seemed 'like a straw drawn up the draught of a chimney.' But it was not for long. He soon became disgusted with what Arnold termed 'idolatry,' and his devotion to what he held to be true made it impossible for him to accept what he felt to be the undue influence placed on Authority by the leaders of the Movement. The result was that he forsook both Arnoldism and Tractarianism for a kind of vague scepticism, which should at any rate be based, as far as he could see, on the divine sanction of Truth.

Clough believed that Truth ran through all life like a thread of gold 'emerging now and then on earth's rude breast, but flowing full below.' It was the duty of man to discover it for himself. He must not expect to see and understand everything, for his horizon is so limited and the world is so vast. Nor must he be dismayed by the many changing aspects that Truth will appear to take — perceptions contradicting one another, convictions coming and then departing. He must relentlessly pursue his quest, exercising the greatest care and consideration, trusting that as much of the Truth as is possible will be revealed to him.

> 'It fortifies my soul to know
> That, though I perish, Truth is so:
> That, howso'er I stray and range,
> Whate'er I do, Thou dost not change.
> I steadier step when I recall
> That, if I slip, Thou dost not fall.'

Clough's difficulty seems to have lain in the fact that he so often wrote with what seemed to be two antagonistic conceptions of Truth in his mind at one and the same time. As Edward Dowden has put it in his *Studies in Literature*:

> 'Clough wrote almost always with the consciousness of two or more conflicting feelings. If he is in the mood for an ideal flight, you may be sure that the most prosaic of demons is at his elbow about to remind him that feet and not wings are the locomotive instruments of a human creature. When he is most devout he becomes the object of the most vigorous assaults of the tempter.'

Still, there were times when Clough got definite glimpses of Truth.

> 'Are you aware,' he writes in a letter from America, 'that Life is very like a railway? One gets into deep cuttings and long dark tunnels,

where one sees nothing and hears twice as much noise as usual, and one can't read, and one shuts up the window, and waits, and then it all comes clear again. Only in life it sometimes feels as if one had to dig the tunnel as one goes along, all new for oneself. Go straight on, however, and one's sure to come out into a new country, on the other side of the hills, sunny and bright.'

We must now try and construct some of the main elements in Clough's religious outlook which lifted the veil of darkness that so often overhung him.

Clough, unlike Wordsworth, Arnold and Meredith, had no definite doctrine of Nature. At the same time he was a real lover of beauty, and was never happier than when he was wandering over the Welsh mountains or through the Scottish glens. There is a true love of Nature in the 'Bothie of Tober-Na-Vuolich'—a long vacation pastoral; and throughout his life many of his most encouraging thoughts were derived from his communion with Nature. In 'An Evening Walk in Spring,' written when he was a boy of seventeen, he finds in Nature both a guide to conscience and a cure for the melancholy that takes possession of his soul. The beauty of Nature convicts him of sin, and the sight of the stately elms enclosing the village church and graveyard heals the sorrow which is in his own heart by pointing to the deeper sorrow that lies in the hearts of men and women. In his poem 'In a Lecture-Room,' written when he was twenty-one, he draws a contrast between philosophy and Nature in favour of the latter. Philosophy only serves to perplex the mind and to leave the spirit dead, whereas through the eyes of Nature we can see 'right onward to the Eternal Shore.' Nature is a guide to life and knowledge. In his 'Blank Misgivings of a Creature moving about in Worlds not Realized,' written when he was twenty-two, it is through communion with Nature that the poet hopes to find strength for life's daily duties:

'With silent woods and hills untenanted
Let me go commune; under thy sweet gloom,
O kind maternal Darkness, hide my head:
The day may come I yet may re-assume
My place, and, these tired limbs recruited, seek
The task for which I now am all too weak.'

In his 'Fragments of the Mystery of the Fall,' the manuscript of which is very imperfect and bears no title, we are told that it is only Time and Nature that can heal the sorrow of Cain:

'My son, Time healeth all,
Time and great Nature; heed her speech, and learn.'

At the same time Clough was perplexed by the cruelty that we so often see in Nature. Nature is both kind and hard. She gives two answers where the poet wants only one; and he finds no relief, as Tennyson did, in the conviction that all that is grim and terrible in Nature exists for a purpose and works towards a divine end. In spite of his reverence for her beauty and for the healing power which she so often displays, there are times when Clough has to write:

'"This is Nature,' I said: 'we are born as it were from her waters;
Over her billows that buffet and beat us, her offspring uncared-for,
Casting one single regard of a painful victorious knowledge,
Into her billows that buffet and beat us we sink and are swallowed.'
This was the sense in my soul, as I swayed with the poop of the steamer;
And as unthinking I sat in the hall of the famed Ariadne,
Lo, it looked at me there from the face of a Triton in marble.
It is the simpler thought, and I can believe it the truer.
Let us not talk of growth; we are still in our Aqueous Ages.'

Amours de Voyage.

Clough's belief in God depended on his prevailing mood. There were times when he felt very certain of God, but there were also moments when his doubts seemed to get the better of him. Though the speaker in 'Blank Misgivings of a Creature moving about in Worlds not Realized' has fallen into grievous sin, and has belied God daily and hourly, he can yet turn to God and say:

'Still Thou art,
Art surely as in heaven the sun at noon;
How much so e'er I sin, whate'er I do
Of evil, still the sky above is blue,
The stars look down in beauty as before.'

Here the poet is in one of his definite moods. In his poem *Wen Gott Betrügt, Ist Wohl Betrogen*, Clough asks if matter is the source of everything. Can the fame of Shakespeare, Milton, Wordsworth, Byron and Shelley be traced to nothing more than a 'peculiar conformation' of the brain and stomach? It may or may not be so. 'The plot has counterplot.' Here we see Clough in one of his more vacillating moods. In his poem 'O Thou of Little Faith' the poet becomes optimistic. In the moment of trial it may be true that there is a Spiritual Presence that gives us aid:

'It may be that indeed and not in fancy,
A hand that is not ours upstays our steps,
A voice that is not ours commands the waves,
Commands the waves, and whispers in our ear,
"O thou of little faith, why didst thou doubt?"
At any rate,
That there are things above us, I believe,
And when we lift up holy hands of prayer,
I will not say they will not give us aid.'

In 'Amours de Voyage' Claude, writing to Eustace, confesses that he does not quite know what to think:

'I believe in Providence partly.
What is ordained is right, and all that happens is ordered.
Ah, no, that isn't it. But yet I retain my conclusion.
I will go where I am led, and will not dictate to the chances.'

Clough puts the whole matter in a nutshell in his 'Dipsychus.' There the Spirit declares that some people find it easy to believe in God because their moods and vocation make such belief easy, while with others it is just the reverse. The wicked, the youngster, the tradesman, the rich man, and those who enjoy good health think little about God, and their belief in Him is shallow if it exists at all. On the other hand, folk who live in the country, people who have just got married, parsons and parsons' wives, and all who have been overtaken by sorrow, age or disease are very inclined to believe in a God, or in 'something very like Him.' One cannot help feeling that one has here a kind of mirror in which the vacillating outlook of Clough is reflected only too well. Had he not been in an academic atmosphere so long, and had he not been subject to moods that changed almost as rapidly as the colours of a chameleon, his faith in the ultimate reality of God might have been far steadier than it was.

In dealing with the problem of pain and evil, Clough found help along three or four different lines apart from any assistance that he may have derived from his treatment of Nature and God. In the first place, he emphasized the reality and the necessity of free-will. This emphasis on the reality of free-will prepared the way for a second strand in Clough's solution to the problem of pain and evil. Like Browning, it led him to assert the necessity of struggle and hardship in life if the best that is in us is to be brought to the surface, and, of course, if it were not for free-will

such a struggle would be impossible. This idea is contained in such poems as 'The Silver Wedding,' 'In the Depths,' "Qui laborat, orat,' 'Life is a Struggle,' and 'Dipsychus.' It is only trial that turns our dreams into substance and our fairy gold into real silver. It is only trial that stirs the Muse to its noblest song, and that enables the mind to read the problems of life aright. It is only trial—the endurance of a 'mortal moral strife'—that allows us to understand the nature of God Himself. The wearing out of heart, brain, and nerves may not be a blissful thing in itself, but it is only in this way that we ourselves can be kept alive. Moreover, it is only through the touch of evil that goodness itself can be appreciated. 'Religion must have a spice of devil.' All life is made up, and necessarily so, of the serpent and the dove, the wheat and the tares.

Clough's emphasis on free-will also prepared the way for his doctrine of Duty. One of the things that impressed Clough's friends most was his reverence for what was right. We may see this from a poem by Professor Shairp entitled 'Balliol Scholars: A Remembrance,' published in 1873. It contains a picture of Clough as he appeared to his colleagues at Oxford:

'All travail pangs of thought too soon he knew,
All currents felt, that shake these anxious years,
Striving to walk to tender conscience true,
And bear his load alone, nor vex his peers.
From these, alas! too soon he moved apart;
Sorrowing they saw him go, with loyal heart,
Such heart as greatly loves, but more reveres.'

With this we may compare Matthew Arnold's 'Thyrsis'—a monody written to commemorate the poet's death:

'To a boon southern country he is fled,
And now in happier air,
Wandering with the great Mother's train divine
(And purer or more subtle soul than thee,
I trow, the mighty Mother doth not see)
Within a folding of the Apennine,
Thou hearest the immortal chants of old!'

Unlike Tennyson, Clough calls upon man to do his duty whether there be any reward in a future life or not. In 'The Questioning Spirit' he faces the problem that although man does not know everything, yet this constitutes no barrier to his doing his duty, and to his rejoicing as he does it.

Clough's final answer to the problem af pain and evil is found in his doctrine of Immortality. He has a vague belief that in the end all will turn out well, and bases this belief in a future life on two main considerations.

First, there is the argument from Instinct:

'Though tortured in the crucible I lie,
Myself my own experiment, yet still
I, or a something that is I indeed,
A living, central, and more inmost I,
Within the scales of mere exterior me,
I—seem eternal, O thou God, as Thou.'

Secondly, there is the argument from Incompleteness. As Dipsychus contemplates the beautiful calm of Campanile he is rebuked by a sense of the incomplete. There comes to him a hint of something more beyond. Sin seems to be a painful opening out to larger virtues, just as the bare field, the dried-up seed and the 'deep plough' are a foretaste of 'autumn's crowded shocks and loaded wains.' The very incompleteness of life is a guarantee of immortality.

'The perfect call
Should force the perfect answer.'

The same idea is present in the second of Clough's 'Seven Sonnets on the Thought of Death.' The earth cannot satisfy the man who has developed a soul:

'But for a being that demands the name
We highest deem—a Person and a Soul—
It troubles us that this should be the whole.'

The same view is again expressed in 'Through a Glass Darkly':

'Ah yet, when all is thought and said,
The heart still overrules the head;
Still what we hope we must believe,
And what is given us receive;

'Must still believe, for still we hope
That in a world of larger scope,
What here is faithfully begun
Will be completed, not undone.'

Of the future life Clough says little. In his poem 'In the Great Metropolis' he seems to think that the next world will be very similar to the present one. The selfishness that we know here will still remain as selfishness after death.

A word must be said on Clough's attitude towards the critical movement of his day. At Oxford, Clough came into vital

contact with the theological criticism and unrest that was so characteristic of the Victorian era; and it has left its mark on such poems as 'Epi-Strauss-ium,' 'The Shadow,' and 'Ah! Yet Consider It Again.' Towards the Person of Jesus he would have maintained a reverent agnosticism. His attitude towards Christianity in general is summed up in a passage in 'The Poems and Prose Remains.' He is speaking about the Atonement:

> 'The Evangelicals gabble at it, as the Papists do their Ave Marys, and yet they say they know; while Newman falls down and worships *because* he does not know, and knows he does not know. I think others are more right, who say boldly, we don't understand it, and therefore we won't fall down and worship it. Though there is no occasion for adding, "There *is* nothing in it," I should say, until I know, I will wait, and if I am not born with the power to discover it, I will do what I can with what knowledge I have—trust to God's justice, and neither pretend to know, nor without knowing pretend to embrace, nor yet oppose those who, by whatever means, are increasing or trying to increase knowledge.'

Clough does not want magic; he wants Truth. He believes, however hard the struggle, that through the simple quest for Truth everything will come all right in the end. This is the answer to the question why we are here. This is the leading idea that should guide us through life, and that has been expressed so clearly in such poems as 'With Whom is no Variableness, neither Shadow of Turning,' and 'Say not the Struggle nought Availeth.'

Life would have been a less exacting, but not so educative, an experience for Clough if he could have entered on it, instead of concluding it, with the philosophy of 'All is Well':

> 'Whate'er you dream with doubt possest,
> Keep, keep it snug within your breast,
> And lay you down and take your rest;
> Forget in sleep the doubt and pain,
> And when you wake, to work again.
> The wind it blows, the vessel goes,
> And where and whither, no one knows.
>
> 'Twill all be well: no need of care;
> Though how it will, and when, and where,
> We cannot see, and can't declare.
> In spite of dreams, in spite of thought,
> 'Tis not in vain, and not for nought,
> The wind it blows, the ship it goes,
> Though where and whither, no one knows.'

PROFESSOR CANNEY ON THE OLD TESTAMENT

By Professor Percy Gardner, Litt.D., F.B.A.

THE title of Mr. Canney's paper in the last issue of the *Modern Churchman*, 'The Anthropological Approach to the Old Testament,' is attractive. Every Modern Churchman will be anxious to learn what the study of anthropology, which has now gained a great and stable position in our Universities, has to add to our endeavours to pour a breath of fresh life into received Christianity. We naturally think of the anthropological researches of Robertson Smith, of Cheyne, of Tylor and others, and especially of Sir James Frazer's great work, *The Golden Bough*, and his later works on the comparative study of the Jewish Scriptures. But I fear we shall be disappointed if we anticipate much light from Professor Canney's paper. It represents the views of a particular school. But it is not marked by the impartiality, the cool judgment, the desire to appreciate all honest work even when it is swayed by a point of view different from that of the writer, which is necessary for a fruitful contribution to knowledge. As Goethe maintained, the real mark of a great critic is not the power of picking holes in other men's work, but the power of appreciating what is best in it.

Professor Canney does not clearly explain what he means by anthropology. In fact it is a question-begging appellation which may be variously interpreted. It should mean the study of man as a *genus* in all his developments, physical, intellectual, moral and spiritual. But it is commonly used as meaning the study of man in his lower reaches, where he most nearly approaches the animal, the study of savages and primitive man as individual and social. To pursue such investigations is of course quite legitimate and profitable, but it should not lead the investigator to think that the part is more than the whole. The question of origins is important, but the question of the line of development is even more important.

I think that most Modernists will read Professor Canney's article with grave dissent. It would be a misfortune if people in general regarded it as expressing the opinion either of this journal or of our society. It is in fact diametrically opposed to the views of most of us. The term Modernist is disliked by many, but it expresses an attitude towards the Christian Church which requires a name. That attitude is twofold, a full appreciation of the inestimable benefits which the Founder and His Church have conferred on humanity, and a keen anxiety that the beliefs and spirit of Christianity should find an expression suitable to the modern world, with its new grasp of science, both natural and human, and its social changes.

So to any adequate modern expression of Christian views two things are necessary, a belief in Christianity as dynamic and progressive rather than static and fixed, and a full appreciation of fact and experience in the modern world.

Professor Canney makes no account of distinctions which have become in modern discussion widely acknowledged, almost axiomatic. The modern theologian distinguishes knowledge of fact, which is the proper field of science, from the estimate of the value of facts, a matter in which science has no place, which belongs to the active personality rather than to the mere intelligence. Mr. Canney regards religion in the light of science only; and as science cannot grasp values, he prefers to leave them out of account.

Professor Canney is hard alike on classical scholars and on theologians, because they both hold that the literature with which they have to do is of unique interest and importance. I hold that both are right. From the point of view of literature, art and philosophy there are no writers so fundamentally important as those of Greece: but of course the great majority of readers profit by them mostly at second hand. From the point of view of religion no writers are so fundamentally important as the Jewish. But what is now maintained is not that that literature is above criticism and sacrosanct, in origin and development different from all other literature, but that when it has been methodically and scientifically studied there comes in further the question of its value from the aesthetic or spiritual

point of view, its power to help life and action. The anthropologist, Professor Canney says, is interested in various peoples equally and impartially. 'He insists upon judging and estimating peoples purely on their merits.' But how does he get his standard of merit? Science cannot furnish it; it belongs to the realm of values. The scientific theologian is perfectly ready to compare the phenomena of one religion with those of another in origin and manifestation. But he does not therefore put the two religions on the same basis of value and truth. Mr. Canney says that in that case he is not impartial. In a sense this is true; if the theologian put the religion of Mumbo Jumbo on the same level of value as that of the Roman or the Methodist Church he might claim a kind of impartiality. So he might if he held that fine claret and vinegar, or ripe plums and sloes, were equally palatable, or that Socrates and Judas Iscariot were equally estimable persons. But if he went through life with such futile impartiality he would come to grief. To a man of taste the difference between good and bad poetry is infinite. So it is in all art judgments. And so it is in theology. The Christian theologian finds in parts of the Jewish Scriptures a sense of values and spiritual realities which puts them so far above the views of the votaries of Astarte and Baal that comparison is almost impossible.

If Prof. Canney could find a scientist who regarded all the matter of religion in a purely intellectual way, who had no preferences, but only a knowledge of all possible creeds, such a man might be ready to accept his dicta. But a merely impartial scientist is not to be found; and in fact he could not in the higher sense be said to be alive. Thomas Huxley, for example, was before all things a scientist; but he had very strong ethical and religious views, and without them he would have been devoid of the impulse of life.

The anthropologist, says Prof. Canney, declines to admit that any particular race has been endowed with a peculiar gift of inspiration. Might he not say with equal truth that the anthropologist denies that any writer is endowed with a gift of inspiration? This may be true of the anthropologist not as a man but as an abstraction. As an abstraction he may be 'interested equally and impartially in each and all religions.' But

we can hardly allow that a Christian is, as such, disqualified for investigations in anthropology. If a man be a disbeliever in all religions, he may take a more intellectually impartial view of them. But would such a man have the least interest in them? It is precisely because man is incorrigibly religious that he cares to study religions in the hope of finding some truth which may heal his troubled soul. 'It would be an immense gain,' says Prof. Canney, 'to Christianity if the Old Testament ceased to be regarded as a work of edification and an aid to devotion for Christians.' It should, then, be regarded in a purely intellectual and scientific light. It is impossible for pedantry to go further. Surely man is not merely a thinking machine but a human soul. He ought to cast out unworthy and selfish prejudices, but he may retain a moral constitution and a purpose in life. How about modern poets and moralists? Are we precluded from admiring and loving one more than another?

One must of course grant that there is much in the Jewish Scriptures which gives a shock to the cultivated modern man, and shows a low level of religion. But there is also much which is religiously splendid. Take the Psalms, for example. One may find in some of them feelings of jealousy, revenge, cruelty; and generally a belief, which experience does not justify, in an equation of worldly prosperity and real goodness. But nevertheless the Psalms have been the life-breath of the Church of Christ for nineteen centuries; they have satisfied the aspirations of the spiritual, and comforted the martyr at the stake. In the wars of the time of the Reformation they were sung alike by Romanists and Protestants on the field of battle. No Christian Church, so far as I know, has ventured to repudiate them.

When one takes an evolutional view of history, as the greater historians and theologians now almost universally do, it is not difficult to account for these unevennesses in morals and theology in the Jewish writings. One recognizes that lower and higher points of view were accepted simultaneously among the people, and history has shown that, generally speaking, the lower view is that of primitive religion, which was gradually discredited and superseded in the religious experience of the race. But Mr. Canney will have none of this view.

> 'There is nothing to show,' he writes, 'that the Hebrews passed through a number of well recognised and ever ascending stages of culture. Nor does it seem to be true that the Hebrews gradually developed a belief in monotheism. It was an old belief which they revived.'

Mr. Canney gives to a Dr. W. Schmidt the credit of the theory of a primitive monotheism which became corrupted. Of course it is a very old theory, which has been revived in our days by Andrew Lang and others. It may be true or not true; but in any case it is not certain enough to upset the whole theory of evolution as applied to religion in a society. Evolution, which may be interpreted in various ways, is at present the only intelligible way of accounting for the facts of Jewish religion, though of course it by no means excludes influences from without.

Indeed, to the modern mind, the Old Testament becomes unintelligible without some theory of development. The religion of *Isaiah* is quite undeniably different from that of *Judges*. How did one grow out of the other? The modern view is that it was by an evolution parallel, though of course not exactly similar, to that which may be discerned in plants and animals, by the inner working of ethical and spiritual forces amid human conditions. Can it be regarded as a purely fortuitous succession of events, or the result only of material forces? The crisis which arose when Judaism passed into Christianity can be studied in the New Testament. There was then a certain change of direction, but hardly of essence. If the Jewish apocryphal writings were printed in our Bibles between the Old and the New Testaments, we could study the transition much more intelligently, as Dr. Charles has so clearly shown in his little book *Between the Old and the New Testaments*.

Professor Canney protests against binding the Old and New Testaments in one volume, and presumably against reading in church lessons from the former. Why this line has been taken by Catholics and Protestants alike, in spite of their extreme dislike of the Jews, is a very complicated historic question into which I cannot go. But clearly this line would not have been taken unless Christians had found between Jewish and Christian scriptures a fundamental kinship, and had discerned a course of development between the two.

Anthropology, according to Mr. Canney, joins issue at once with the notion that the religion of the Jews was unique. Surely the religion of any people is unique, as belonging to its inner and spiritual being. In fact, every individual is unique; but it does not follow that they all stand on the same spiritual level. Mr. Canney is fond of using the word *human*: he even speaks of *human* history as something different from ordinary history. He seems to mean history with any notion of divine providence or divine inspiration left out. But, according to all Christians, such a history would be feeble and one-sided. To every nation, as to every person, it is given to recognize some side of the life of the spirit and to further it in the world. All nations, Greek, Roman, Jewish, Persian, Indian and what not, play a part in the great plan. The races are all human, but they are not on the same level. The notion of *égalité* is utterly repudiated in the constitution of the world. No two grains of sand, no two flakes of snow, are exactly alike. Narrowness of mind is shown not by having a strong conviction in religious matters, but by refusing to allow that others also may have strong and conscientious views to which they also have a right.

The present paper is a criticism of a point of view rather than of an individual; but I may add a few words as to Mr. Canney's authorities. He refers to a number of writers almost unknown in this country, but hardly ever to the workers who in our country have made anthropology a great and living study. We do not find mention of Robertson Smith, Cheyne and Driver on the one side, or of Jevons, Marett and a host of modern Englishmen on the other. Especially we miss any mention of Sir James Frazer. Frazer, as we all know, has written a fascinating work on the Old Testament in the light of anthropology. No foreign writer has written a work on this theme which equals it in range and interest. In his fear of insular prejudice, Mr. Canney, as is often the case in England, weights the scales against his countrymen. Whatever anthropology may be, it is notably an English study.

Q AND THE ARGUMENT FROM MIRACLES

By R. B. Henderson, M.A., Headmaster of Alleyn's School.

ALL modern students of the Gospels recognize that the authors of *Matthew* and *Luke* made use of *Mark* and incorporated large portions of it into their Gospels. They also made use of another very important literary source called Q (Quelle). The core of Q is found in *Matthew* and *Luke* in those identical, or almost identical, passages which the authors of those Gospels have not derived from *Mark*. The precise limits of Q in *Matthew* and *Luke* are extremely difficult to determine, and for the four following reasons:

(1) *Mark* and Q sometimes overlap.
(2) *Matthew* may preserve passages from Q omitted by *Luke*.
(3) *Luke* may include Q material omitted by *Matthew*.
(4) Both *Matthew* and *Luke* may alter the original Q, either by change or by addition.

Verses occur here and there that are, and probably must always remain, of doubtful origin, but I am convinced that enough of Q is determinable for any reader to obtain such an insight into the mind of the author as will enable him to apply the tests of taste, feeling, style, diction and general trend to most of these doubtful passages with a reasonable hope of reaching a satisfactory solution. Moreover, in those few instances where failure must be admitted, the loss or gain to Q by the subtraction or addition of the questionable passages is of little or no importance.

Supposing that the conclusions to which I have been tentatively led are even approximately correct, some rather interesting results follow, and it is my object in this article to exhibit one of them by showing the manner in which Q deals with miracles.

There are five Q passages involving the argument from miracles, but one of them—the Beelzebub controversy—occurs also in Mark, which renders the disintegration of Q unusually

difficult. It seems clear that in Q (*Luke* xi, 14=*Mat.* xii, 22) a dumb man was healed, but the incident is used *not* to indicate the Messiahship of Jesus but to lead up to '. . . by whom do your sons cast them out? . . . but if I, by the finger of God, cast out demons, then is the Kingdom of God come upon you' (*Luke* xi, 19, 20=*Mat* xii, 27, 28). A profound saying which, as always with Jesus, goes to the root of the problem and leaves, or should leave, no doubt as to the proper use of 'miracles.'

Proceeding, we find four passages in Q and not in Mark from which to derive the opinion of the author of Q on this very important question, and, in so short a book, four is a large number.

(1) The Temptation. (*Matt.* iv, 1-11; *Luke* iv, 1-13).
(2) The Centurion's Servant. (*Matt.* viii, 5-12; *Luke* vii, 1-9; and xiii, 28, 29.)
(3) The Messengers of John. (*Matt.* xi, 2-6; *Luke* vii, 18-23.)
(4) The Sign of Jonah. (*Matt.* xii, 38-45; *Luke* xi, 29-32.)

Now the first thing to notice about these four passages is that although the verbal similarity between Matthew and Luke is, on the whole, close, there are serious differences between the two accounts in each one of the four passages, and these differences generally centre round the question of miracles. It may be put otherwise thus: *if* both Matthew and Luke had held the view which I now believe Q to have held, these differences would have been most unlikely to have occurred.

(1) *The Temptation.* The account given in Q of the Temptation ought really to have settled the question of miracles for ever. Lest this should, however, lead to misapprehension, let me hasten to add that the fault lies not in the acceptance or the denial of certain stories related in the Gospels, but in the use made of them. Half our troubles from this source would disappear if we could separate in our minds the two totally distinct and hardly related propositions:

(*a*) Jesus performed many wonderful deeds;
(*b*) because He did, therefore He was the Son of God.

The first is true, but Jesus Himself rejected the second at the Temptation. Luke's order must be correct; to begin with,

there is the trio — Moses (bread in the wilderness); David (the Earthly King); and the Son of Man coming from the clouds (Daniel); but although this may have *suggested* the form of the Temptation, the attack is really much more subtle than these three concepts imply.

This is not an essay on the Temptation, and therefore all that should now be said is that, in the third, Jesus refused to gain adherents by a display of power. 'There shall no sign be given them.' Unfortunately for us, the followers of Jesus would not accept the Lord's ruling. Most of them thought that on this matter they could improve on the Master's method, and we are still reaping the fruits of the tare-seeds they sowed.

Luke and Matthew can copy Q's account of the Temptation —Matthew by an alteration of the order obscuring the issue, but marvellously well revealing himself — and then ignore its lesson.

But is Q himself equally guilty? Q, who alone has preserved this story of the Temptation, does *he*, too, go straight away and make use of the very device which he has told us is of diabolical origin? We turn to the healing of the Centurion's servant and wonder. We read of the answer to John's messengers, and think we have no further need of witnesses. Yet I am convinced that this is unfair to Q, and it is the detailed examination of the other three passages in Q which has caused me to change my mind. Once again may I emphasize the fact that in each of the three cases I had already performed the work of Q-reconstruction before I even noticed that, by so doing, I had cleared Q of the charge of misusing the miraculous element in the Gospel story?

(2) *The Centurion's servant.* The similarity of the accounts given in Matthew and in Luke is set off by a not less remarkable difference, and it is necessary to say a word about it, not because the difference has in itself any bearing on the point now at issue, but because it seems to emphasize the verbal agreement in just the place where it is most useful for our purpose. The difference is that in Matthew the Centurion himself goes to Jesus, and in Luke he sends his messengers.

It is clear that there were several versions of the story — John gives us a third variant — but this only brings out more

plainly the *agreement* of Matthew and Luke in the verses immediately preceding the performance of the miracle.[1] When, however, we come to the miracle itself, *Matthew* viii, 3*b* and *Luke* vii, 10, not a single word is the same in the two verses. Even the one word 'servant' in the English version represents παῖς in Matthew and δοῦλος in Luke. Clearly *both* are not Q, and one is forced to try the effect of omitting the verse altogether. When this is done, it is found that we have a perfectly intelligible consecutive passage, but no miracle. Q read as follows:

> 'And a certain centurion's servant, who was dear unto him, was sick and at the point of death. And when he heard concerning Jesus he sent unto him elders of the Jews, asking him that he would come and save his servant. And they, when they came to Jesus, besought him earnestly, saying, he is worthy that thou shouldest do this for him: for he loveth our nation, and himself built us our synagogue. And Jesus went with them. And when he was now not far from the house, the centurion sent friends to him, saying unto him, Lord, trouble not thyself: for I am not worthy that thou shouldest come under my roof: wherefore neither thought I myself worthy to come unto thee; but say the word, and my servant shall be healed. For I also am a man set under authority, having under myself soldiers; and I say to this one, Go, and he goeth; and to another, Come, and he cometh; and to my servant, Do this, and he doeth it. And when Jesus heard these things, he marvelled at him, and turned and said unto the multitude that followed him, I say unto you, I have not found so great faith, no, not in Israel. And I say unto you, that many shall come from the east and from the west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven, but the sons of the kingdom shall be cast forth into the outer darkness; there shall be the weeping and gnashing of teeth.'

A beautiful story illustrating the greater faith of the Gentiles as compared with the Jews.

Matthew evidently had another version, which, according to his usual method he conflates with Q. Luke records a miracle that was not in his source-book, and unless the miracle was in Matthew's *other* version, he does the same.

This is by no means too great a burden to place on the shoulders of these two writers. We can see the process at work, for, by great good fortune, we have Mark preserved to us. Let anyone read the story of Jairus's daughter in Mark and find a miracle in the Greek if he can. Jesus expressly says, 'She is not dead, but sleepeth.' Nor would it be natural to take καθεύδω

[1] Of the forty-nine words of Matthew which precede the miracle (taking verses 9 and 10, for 11 and 12 come afterwards in Luke), forty-five are exactly as in Luke, four partly so and one Ἀμήν is new.

as symbolic of death — that is a rare use of the word (*Thess.* v, 10, is almost a solitary instance)—and the first words, 'She is not dead,' must mean what they say. Jesus could hardly have said, 'She is not dead but she is dead.' But the words of Jesus as quoted by Mark are not enough for Matthew or Luke. *Both* contradict, while recording, them, because they insist on a miracle. And if they thus treat Mark, is it not reasonable to assume that they may treat Q in the same way?

(3) *The messengers of John.* In this Q passage, Luke has two verses, 20 and 21 (chapter vii) which are entirely absent from Matthew:

> 'And when the men were come unto him, they said, John the Baptist hath sent us unto thee, saying, Art thou he that cometh, or look we for another?
>
> 'In that hour he cured many of diseases and plagues and evil spirits; and on many that were blind he bestowed sight.'

Were they in Q? Surely not. To begin with, if they had been, could Matthew, with his known love of the miracle-argument, have resisted such a glorious opportunity of illustrating it? Again, consider the incongruity of the supposed scene. Even if we allow, for a moment, that Jesus had not always refused 'signs,' and that He was willing to make an exception in favour of John the Baptist, is it not a somewhat undignified picture that is here presented to us? And why should such 'proof' be likely to influence John?—John, of all people, the greatest man alive according to the testimony of the Master himself! Surely he did not need miracles to confirm his weakening faith.

Moreover, the entire argument is ruined if we must take the healing of the blind and the lame in a literal physical sense. Jesus must have had *Isaiah* xxix and xxxv in mind, and no one ever reads those chapters in a literal sense. The climax, too—'the poor have the good news preached to them'—creates a sad *anti*-climax if we must suppose that the previous words refer to the healing of the body. And why did not Jesus 'in that same hour' give a specimen of His preaching, too? It is too palpably false, and nothing but Luke's predilection towards miracles could have caused such a terrible lapse.

Now look at the two offending verses themselves. The first one (20) is a mere repetition of the verse before, but it is

necessary, for without it 'in that same hour' cannot be made to fit in. Schmiedel long ago drew attention to another peculiarity of this insertion. In verse 21 the blind are specially mentioned. Now Luke has not previously recorded the healing of a blind man. We have had all other diseases already dealt with, but this particular one is missing: Luke provides the deficiency.

As in the case of the Centurion's servant, leave out these verses and note how smoothly the passage reads — and once more Q is cleared.

(4) *Lastly, there is the 'Sign of Jonah.'* The meaning is plain enough. There shall no sign be given save the sign of Jonah. If this had referred to the incident of the whale, it would have been a sign after the hearts of that generation; but this is exactly what is to be denied. And what evidence is there that the Ninevites knew anything about the whale? The story does not say that Jonah mentioned it, and it is in the last degree unlikely that he would have done so. (This, of course, is taking the story literally, a fault which was not universal until mediaeval times.)

The Ninevites repented at the *preaching* of Jonah, and that is precisely the 'sign' with which 'this adulterous generation' is to be confronted. It is because they will not accept the preaching of Jesus that the Ninevites will rise up in judgment against them. It is Matthew this time who steps in with an interpretation of his own. If the words about the Resurrection had been in Q, how could Luke have missed them? They ruin the argument and present us with a further difficulty — how could the Jews be expected to accept a 'sign' which would only be vouchsafed them *after* they had committed their tragic blunder?

Again, let it be noted how smoothly the passage runs if *Matthew* xii, 40 is omitted.

In view of these four passages, are we not justified in believing that there were those in our Lord's own time who understood that an exhibition of power can prove only the existence of power, and that the world did not need the revelation of God's own Son to be taught the Might of God? He came that goodness might be revealed without miracle, and among those choice spirits who understood may be reckoned the author of Q.

NEW WINE IN OLD BOTTLES

By Miss M. D. Petre, author of *The Life of George Tyrrell.*

I HAVE chosen the above title to the following study of Mr. Lewis May's volume, *Father Tyrrell and the Modernist Movement*,* and I have chosen it because Mr. May holds that this same text from St. Luke played an almost magical part in Tyrrell's thought and career. I have chosen it also because I think that this theory exercised a disproportionate influence on Mr. May's treatment of his subject, and that his view of Father Tyrrell's use of the text was a mistake at the root of many others.

> 'We may legitimately wonder,' he writes, 'what course Tyrrell's career would have taken had any illustration other than that of "new wine" and "old bottles" occurred to his mind. It haunted him. . . . In his vision the path of human progress was marked by a long line of discarded bottles. He was so in love with this simile . . . that he had no thought for any other.'

And then he goes on to propose another symbol, by the adoption of which Tyrrell's whole history might have been altered. Supposing, Mr. May suggests, he had taken instead the simile of the Aeolian harp, of which the frame would be the Church, 'the chords her Sacraments, her creeds, her formularies, and the airs that steal along them the aspirations and the hopes of men' (p. 19). Well, such a simile might have served Tyrrell's purpose, though it would have lacked the sacred character of the former, which owed its origin to One greater than himself. But might not the harp have suggested precisely the same difficulties if the airs that stole along the chords, those airs that expressed the ever-changing thoughts and needs of man, had been sternly prohibited; if the window had been shut and the tunes suppressed?

Mr. May's introductory chapter does, indeed, with the words above quoted, give the gist of the whole work, with its sympathy for the genius and even, to some extent, the character of the man, and yet its inadequate comprehension of his problem. But when a man has spent his life in one long, fierce struggle with a problem, can you possibly understand him fully if you have no adequate sense of the problem?

I cannot agree with the remark of one reviewer, who reproaches Mr. May chiefly for the lack of portraiture in his

* Published by Eyre & Spottiswoode, price 10/6 (1932).

volume. But he suggests the same reproach in regard to the Autobiography and Life, and the former is surely as living a presentment of character as one could well find, allowing for the severity with which a man of Tyrrell's type deals with his own personality. Of course the subject is elusive; you cannot have a clean-cut image of a personality full of contradictory qualities; but a certain puzzlement is, in such cases, of the essence of understanding.

I would therefore utter a word in defence of Mr. May on this point, in spite of certain inconsistencies in his estimate. He has soaked himself in the Autobiography, and has experienced from its study that sense of mingled fascination and irritation which its author so often excited. I have always thought that Swift, though lacking Tyrrell's nobility, may have provoked love and admiration in a somewhat analogous fashion. Their very perversity stimulated affection; their temper, their naughtiness, constituted an appeal. For Tyrrell was reckless in his methods of attack just because he had no care for his own reputation, and his personal disinterestedness kindled affection while its manifestations roused irritation. His face was, in some ways, a manifestation of these characteristics, with its strange ugliness and equally marked attractiveness. I have heard that his religious *confrères* would request him, in that chaffing spirit which can only exist amongst those who love each other, to sit by the door of the train when they were journeying together, 'to prevent,' as they politely remarked, 'other people from getting in.' We have here just a proof of the lovableness of his very defects.

Mr. May has, I think, gripped his subject on this, its personal side; he has realized, through others if not by his own direct apprehension, that here was someone gifted with that magic quality that transmutes ordinary liking into love. And this appreciation need in no way be lessened by an even exaggerated disapproval of the less pleasing characteristics. Only in one place have I noted an indictment which appears to me wholly mistaken and false, and that is where he says of the subject of his memoir:

> 'Posing, the distinguishing characteristic of the egoist, was, quite unsuspected by himself, the inherent and besetting flaw in his character, and produced the egoism which so ruffled the waters over which he had to steer his barque' (p. 108-109).

This accusation is monstrous to those who knew Tyrrell, and it is, in fact, out of harmony with the rest of the study:

> 'If he was the leader of the Modernists,' writes Mr. May, 'he was also the dearest of them. His trials, his disappointments, his very misfortunes, combined to invest him with an unaccountable attraction For all his waywardness, for all his fiery outbursts of temper, there was something sweet and companionable about him; no trace of superiority, of condescension, of intellectual snobbery' (p. 229).

But I think this strange judgment as to egotistic pose has escaped the writer just because of his failure, as I have said, to apprehend either the problem which continually faced Tyrrell or his attempts at its solution. Mr. May has not adopted the perfectly consistent attitude of those for whom the official teaching of the Church has an answer to all intellectual difficulties, and for whom Modernism, with its suggestion of the continual need of fresh and living interpretation of creed and dogma, is just damnable and nothing more. He has set himself a more complicated task by an attempted analysis of the nature of the problem, in so far as it presented itself to the mind of Tyrrell, and of the particular way in which he reacted to it, whether in his own soul or in his efforts to help the souls of others. For Modernism is a loose and undefined expression, and the Modernism of Tyrrell was not that of von Hügel, or of M. Loisy. But in this attempted analysis Mr. May has, I venture to say, failed. For what is the gist of his criticism of Tyrrell's Modernism? He maintains that he was swept from his religious bearings by

> 'his overwhelming respect for the scientists. It was his eagerness always to be in the forefront of the intellectual fray, to know and to assimilate the latest ideas, that bred in him an impatience of old methods, old formularies, because they were old, and of those who professed them, because they were venerable' (p. 229).

We might remark, in passing, that this reproach as to Tyrrell's regard for what is old is rather inconsistent with another passage, in which he accuses him of

> 'the enthusiasm of the antiquarian, of the lover of all things venerable and beautiful' (p. 252).

But let that be for the present. In another place he says that, for Tyrrell,

> 'Religion, it seems, was to come labouring and panting along in the wake of Science, to whose chariot it was bound and whose course it was compelled to follow' (p. 225).

This reproach of over-respect for intellect and science is the

recurring one of the whole work, and in it is concentrated that misunderstanding of Tyrrell's philosophy, and of the Modernist problem, which renders the work so inadequate a presentment of the man and his thought.

Surely Mr. May cannot have studied one particular article of Tyrrell's which he himself regarded as the kernel of his message, round which all his later teaching had clustered, the article entitled 'Theology and Devotion,' which is precisely a plea for the rights of faith as against the over-scientific treatment of religion by much current theology.

The intellectual difficulties to faith, which come to a head in recurring periods of religious history, and which appeared under a special form in the time of the Modernist movement, were largely due, in Tyrrell's mind, to an unlawful conception of the true character of theology. He was not a foe of theology, as Mr. May would lead us to believe; nor was he a foe of dogma; but he was a foe of theology when it was presented as a science on a footing with other sciences, or even superior to them in its scientific character; he was a foe of dogmas when they were regarded as complete and final expressions of religious truth.

He was, indeed, too much of a poet not to realize that science itself must not outstrip its barriers, nor attempt to measure, with its instruments, the mysteries at which only poetry can hint.

> 'There is the dry, barren knowledge of a violet which the soulless botanist can attain to: and there is the joy-inspiring sense of its beauty which the child or the poet experiences.'[1]

How closely akin are these lines to those in which he accuses theologians, who rob the simple, devout faithful of their joy in the Eucharistic mystery, by their insistence on barren subtleties.[2] Referring to a letter of Tyrrell to von Hügel, Mr. May writes:

> 'And yet he' (Tyrrell) 'did not see that the process which he so fanatically advocated, the mixing of the two planes, the confusing of two worlds, the seen and unseen, the intellectualizing of the spiritual, would inevitably have the same disheartening effect on the mass of Catholics as the Baron's attempt to economise had on him. Once Christianity is made dependent on intellectual gifts or attainments, on academic qualifications or scientific knowledge, then the "little ones" of Christ feel themselves exiled and dispossessed, duped and deceived, treated with fairy tales' (pp. 182, 183).

[1] *Nova et Vetera.*

[2] See the article on 'Theology and Devotion' in *Through Scylla and Charybdis.*

A more complete misreading of the entire message of the man could scarcely be found. His whole effort was to justify faith by proving that its one object was realities and values that no scientific criticism could lessen. 'I distinguish sharply' (he wrote, and Mr. May quotes the words even while he overlooks their sense) 'between the Christian revelation and the theology that rationalizes and explains it.' A few pages before giving us this quotation our author declares that Tyrrell's reinterpretation 'took the shape of an elimination of the supernatural' (p. 217).

Unbelievers might, indeed, accuse him of defying reason in his maintenance of the spiritual meaning and truth of a fact which history had tended to unsettle; and theologians could, and did, accuse him of shirking the purely rational and scientific value of their own apologies. But so far was he from 'mixing the two planes of the seen and unseen,' from 'eliminating the supernatural,' that his tendency, if excessive, was in the other direction—in that of so subordinating the visible sign to the invisible reality, the rational explanation to the supernatural meaning, as to lessen the importance of the former and not the latter. His appeal was to the mystical apprehension of the saint rather than to the closely-reasoned arguments of the theologian; and if, through all the vicissitudes of his mental career, he preserved a certain allegiance to St. Thomas, it was because he believed that at bottom the teaching of the great doctor was far more spiritual than the later developments of scholasticism; and if he remained faithful to his first protest against theological subtleties, it was because he upheld the rights of the simple and believed that the supernatural realities of faith should be defended by other means than those of rationalistic science. It was in fact, for him, exactly the *scientific* pretensions of theology that were unjustifiable.

And was he not right? Can theology, with its dependence on revelation, which is essentially something outside the bounds of recognized human science, compete, with any chance of success, against those sciences which contain their own verification, in so far as our limited knowledge is at all verifiable? If she advances to the dispute armed only with the weapons of human reason, and is worsted, has she then a right to appeal to

another tribunal? Has she not stepped down into the wrong arena, and thus risked a fall to which she ought never to have been subjected? She may, indeed, be the mistress of all sciences, but only in so far as she allows each one to minister to her own divine message, bringing out of them that spiritual ore which matter is yielding every day in greater quantities.

> 'Will learning, knowledge, science, make a man a better Christian than the Curé of Ars or Father Damien?' exclaims Mr. May. 'Would these have been better Christians if they had been fortified with all the science of Tübingen?' (p. 274).

'Certainly not,' Father Tyrrell would have replied (the Curé d'Ars was an admired saint in his gallery), and would have added: 'Nor even had they been fortified by all the subtleties of scholastic theologians from Suarez onwards.'

What, then, was Tyrrell's true meaning in his frequent use of that Gospel text which had, in Mr. May's view, so disastrous an effect on him?

First of all, he did not deny that 'the old wine was best'; for the old wine was that of the primitive revelation of Christianity, which had been stored in earthly vessels. But those vessels were not able to contain the constantly developing life of the Christian message, which, in its human manifestations, must ever grow or die. But theology, or, rather, theologians, seemed to him more intent on the preservation of the vessel than on the diffusion of its contents. Let the vessels be renewed, but let the stream of life not be checked; and do not try futile patchings to a garment which must go the way of all things earthly.

Did Tyrrell find a satisfactory answer to the problems he so boldly faced? No, alas! And who has done so? Let those who have discovered such final and satisfactory answers cast their stones at the one who failed; but if they have not found such answers, let them remember Christ as He traced letters on the ground!

I will not, indeed, class Mr. May amongst those who stoned him. I am glad he wrote the book I have criticized in these pages. I am not sorry that he has set forth the failings of the subject of his memoir; though, in fact, I myself endeavoured that, through the publication of his life and letters and confession, none of his faults should be left to be revealed at a later time.

As to those faults, they sometimes infected the good work, but, on the other hand, I have often asked myself whether many, who would never dream of thanking him, do not owe to his action a liberty of thought and speech which they would not otherwise have attained; whether he did not, indeed, by his very indiscretions, knock down obnoxious barriers that will never be replaced.

Anyhow, if Mr. May has, as I cannot but hold, failed to apprehend the man's true message, he has at any rate recognized the pathos and tragedy of George Tyrrell's life and death.

BOOK REVIEWS

MEDIAEVAL FAITH

Readers of Canon MacCulloch's articles in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* know what to expect when he publishes a book on myths, mythology and folklore. It is hardly necessary, therefore, to wait for a review of his new work to tell them that it is worth reading.* It may be taken for granted that the writer gives a vast amount of reliable information based upon original sources. He never panders to popular taste, a pernicious practice which has become too prevalent of late owing to the demand that books must pay their way. On the other hand, if his writings are not light reading, they are not too heavy to be interesting. If there is any reason for disappointment with the new work, it is that the writer has not told some of his readers all that they would like to hear. But in a field so extensive he could hardly do otherwise than follow his own special interests in the hope that what interests him will interest many others. He says in his Preface that the book is the fruit of many years' reading in different fields of medieval history, and that his purpose in writing it will be amply fulfilled if he can interest, instruct or entertain his readers. He certainly achieves this purpose. He has no idea, though he does not say so, of putting forward any pet theories of his own. He is informing rather than provocative.

The first part of the book deals with such subjects as the medieval fairy creed, demons, the cult and legends of the Virgin, the saints, relics, the Host, and miracles. Many of the beliefs about these things are ordinary pagan survivals. The writer thinks that certain ideas about demons, for instance, were introduced into Christian beliefs from Egyptian demonology. He might well have included Babylonian demonology. Indeed, according to Mr. Stephen Langdon, whose book on Semitic mythology was reviewed recently in these pages, this had a paramount influence on Christian superstitions. Beliefs about relics and miracles probably originated in a somewhat different way. The more one reads about these, the more one realizes that the same kind of beliefs have become part and parcel of all the great religions. Whether they have grown up independently or have been borrowed from an archetypal pattern is a moot question. But to some of us it looks very much as though one religion had provided a framework into which the others have been fitted.

The cult of saints gave rise to what Canon MacCulloch, speaking particularly of the Middle Ages, describes as sacred fiction. The taste for this

* *Mediaeval Faith and Fable.* By Canon J. A. MacCulloch. With a Foreword by Sir James Frazer, O.M. pp. 345. (George G. Harrap & Co.: 1932. 15/- net.)

kind of literature, as he says, steadily increased. 'In the medieval period, when the saints were so important in the lives and beliefs of men, the popularity of this literature was at its highest, as may be seen from the many editions of such collections as the *Vitae Patrum* of Rosweyd, and the *Legenda Aurea* of Jacobus de Voragine.' But this kind of story-telling is really very old. Early examples of it are provided by some of the Old Testament and New Testament apocrypha, and even by narratives or parts or narratives in the Bible itself. It is a common Oriental device to emphasize the greatness of a hero or saint by adorning his biography with marvellous stories. The device is resorted to frequently in Hebrew, Syriac, Arabic, and Hellenistic Greek literature. Such stories were never intended to be taken seriously. But they do indicate, and were intended to indicate, that the persons about whom they are told made a tremendous impression.

The second part of the book deals with such subjects as heretics, sceptics, fanatics, the Goliards, and those ever-recurring beliefs about the end of the world. One feels that this section might well have claimed a separate volume, and that the space gained might have been devoted to an amplification of some of the chapters in the first section. However, we must take the book as we find it. Here we are confronted by more abstract things — intellectual, sentimental, and neurotic reactions to a too rigidly orthodox Christian faith. Heresy at its best gives life, or new life, and purity to religion. In their own days Zoroaster, Jesus, and Muhammad were heretics. But heresy at its worst is not attractive. The Catharists carried their heresy so far that their teaching became definitely anti-social and endangered the life of society. Scepticism was carried at times to lengths equally insane. Examples of sentimental fanaticism are provided by certain medieval pilgrimages, and by such movements as the Children's Crusades. These latter migrations, due to a lack of mental balance, sent thousands of boys and girls from land to land following in the wake of leaders who were mere lads themselves. The more ordinary eccentricities caused by a diseased state of the nerves are not peculiar to any one age, and are quite common in the age in which we live. Another kind of reaction is characterized by scurrility and satire, and even by obscenity. This seems to be rooted in an antipathy to a faith which has become too puritanical and prudish. The Goliards, to whom the writer devotes a chapter, belonged to a class of scholars who wandered about, haunting taverns, gambling, living loosely, and writing poems and songs satirizing the orthodox faith. All this is very shocking. But here again we must not take things too seriously. Like a certain kind of modern art and literature which clamours indecently for attention, this kind of behaviour merely proclaims a hectic revolt against old and moribund doctrines. It denotes a state which is temporary and transitional, a state of delirium from which the patient will certainly recover, though he will never see things in quite the same light as before.

MAURICE A. CANNEY.

THE INHUMANISM OF HUMANISM*

There are few writers with so fascinating a style as Dr. Henry Emerson Fosdick. His books have the two-fold aspect of providing both an intellectual study of the particular problem discussed and also a keenly sympathetic understanding of the average reader's approach to that problem. His style has all the inflections of good oratory; he knows just when to argue his case and when to leave the conclusion to the imagination, when to coax his opponent and when to trounce him. And we believe we are justified in saying that his latest book (*As I see Religion*) is among the best which he has written. It provides a lucid examination of Humanism,

* *As I see Religion.* By H. E. Fosdick. (S.C.M.: 1932. Price 5/-.)

of absorbing interest and the more convincing because it is so sympathetic to the other point of view.

Dr. Fosdick begins by asking, What is Religion? He discusses some of the things commonly regarded as the essence of religion—worship, self-committal, the sense of sacredness, etc., but sums them up as 'individual experience of devotion to spiritual values.' Such experience, he admits, is not confined to the Churches: 'When the modern mind hears the creeds upon which many of the Churches still insist, with all the corollaries brought out by controversy and urged as indispensables of religious truth —old cosmologies, doctrines of Biblical infallibility, miracles like virgin birth or physical resurrection — the reaction is not simply incredulity, although incredulity is undoubtedly emphatic, but wonder as to what such things have to do with religion' (p. 25).

If this is religion, what essentially is Christianity? Here Dr. Fosdick offers an answer which at first seems superficial. He believes that all of the things usually advanced by 'popular orthodoxy' as differentiating the Christian religion from others—Sacred Books, Miracles, Deification, Regeneration, etc. — can really be paralleled in them. But 'the genius of Christianity lies in reverence for personality' (p. 42). The emphasis of Jesus on this constitutes the uniqueness of His message. 'He thought of personality as the central fact in the universe and used it as the medium of interpretation for all other facts.' And it is over this central fact that Christianity has yet to fight for its life. If materialism or behaviourism or any such mechanical interpretation of the universe should win the day, man will come to be regarded as 'a local disease of the cosmos — a kind of pestiferous eczema.'

And what of Humanism? Dr. Fosdick gives a most sympathetic analysis of it. It is often 'tonic and stimulating' and has a good deal to teach popular Christianity. For example:

> 'What all humanists desire to escape is supernaturalism, but in this they have the cordial agreement of a great body of theists. Supernaturalism is an obsolete word and it stands for an obsolete idea. Its history displays its irrelevancy to modern thought . . . The partition of our world into a natural order overlaid by a supernatural order which keeps breaking through is to a well-instructed mind impossible' (p. 81).

Nevertheless, it is not enough to get rid of the idea of the supernatural. The real distinction is not between natural and supernatural but between physical and spiritual, and this distinction Humanism has been loath to admit. Hence, in spite of many excellencies which Dr. Fosdick can point out in Humanism, he finds it a tentative makeshift which postpones some difficulties and refuses to face others. But especially it fails before the great question of personality. The universe of the Humanist is basically non-psychical, non-personal and non-spiritual. 'In a cosmos thus negligent of human values, personality has evolved and will ultimately perish . . . Here lies the difficulty of a successful humanism: it sucks the egg of personality's value and then tries to hatch a high religion out of it' (p. 85).

There follows an excellent chapter on the challenge of the psychologist that religion is only a pacifying fantasy, a compensatory device to make life comfortable. Again Dr. Fosdick grants that a good deal of the charge has been true, because popular religion has been egocentric. Even popular modernism:

> 'A comfortable modernism which, eliminating harsh and obsolete orthodoxies and making a few mental adjustments to scientific world-views, contents itself with a sentimentalised God and a roseate optimism will, if it continues, encourage the worst opinions of religion as a pacifying fantasy' (p. 112).

The only adequate answer is a religion which (1) takes into full account the law-abiding nature of the world, (2) is characterised through and through by self-renunciation, (3) endeavours not to escape the world but to transform it. And such a religion, says Dr. Fosdick, is real Christianity.

The book also contains a challenging discourse called 'But Religion is an Art.' The title sufficiently explains its theme. While acknowledging and welcoming all that science and scientific thinking has done for modern times, Dr. Fosdick ably argues that 'religion in its central meanings is far nearer to being a fine art than to being a science.' The closing chapter faces up to the question whether morals would be maintained apart from religion and answers with an emphatic 'No.' 'Our morals, at their deepest, are our innermost response to life, our spiritual quality, taste and motive—and that, separated from our total philosophy, is as unreal as the smile abstracted from the face of the cat in *Alice in Wonderland*' (p. 161).

Most of the writers quoted and criticised by Dr. Fosdick are Americans, from which we conclude that humanism is much more popular there than here. We hope that this book will prevent the inhumanism of this humanism from obtaining a stronghold in this country. J. P. Hodges.

MARRIAGE AS AN INSTITUTION*

Marriage as a natural relationship between man and woman is one thing, and marriage as an institution is another. The former was emphasised by Jesus Christ; the latter is man-made and man-marred. Unfortunately, it is the latter which in controversy is allowed to oust the former.

Dr. Worsley-Boden has produced the best book on marriage as an institution since the appearance of Mr. J. P. Bishop's *Marriage and Divorce* in 1873. He treats his subject under the main headings of 'Marriage and Divorce in History'; 'Relief under the Present Law'; 'A Plea for Reform'; 'A Rationale of Reform.' And throughout he shows a breadth of vision, an intimate knowledge of all relevant history, and of the bewildering intricacy of the laws concerning marriage, joined to a humanity which is not altogether usual in the opponents of reform.

Dr. Worsley-Boden writes as a whole-hearted reformer, but is, like all sane reformers, well aware of the reasons which impel opponents to resistance. Both sides are agreed that 'the ministers of the sacrament' are the marrying couple; that marriage, especially when Christian, has several ends; that the interests of the partners overtop those of the community; that the children are an important factor; that marriage is, considered as an institution, founded on consent, which by law is hardened into a contract; that in idea marriage is a lifelong partnership; and that such a partnership should not be ended save for weighty reasons.

So far both sides are in agreement. Their differences begin when the question is raised as to what those weighty reasons are—a question not to be answered by appeal to religious texts or legal authorities. When the rubbish of such appeals is cleared away, the welfare of the married persons and their family, and the requirements of the social order can alone determine the issue.

Dr. Worsley-Boden is at pains to contrast the Civil Law with the Canon Law, to the discredit of the latter. He admits that marriage must ever be regulated by law. But his gravamen is that the existing law is bad, and tends to defeat the ends of marriage. 'The Canon Law,' he says, 'was an ecclesiastical expedient which ministered to the power of the mediaeval

* *Mischiefs of the Marriage Law.* By J. F. Worsley-Boden, M.A., D.Litt. (Pub. Williams & Norgate: 1932. Price 21/-.)

Papacy over private life, but had little relation to Christianity or to social needs. Yet the survival of Canon Law principles in English law has almost achieved the disastrous identification of Christianity with cruelty. The Roman Church is the arch-enemy of progressive life, and Protestants who oppose the reform of our Marriage and Divorce Laws are deluded disciples of the Pope.' These are not the expression of a merely ardent Protestant, but are supported by facts and arguments which the author's critics will find it difficult to gainsay.

Dr. Worsley-Boden might have quoted so eminent an authority as Mr. Justice Hill, who was reported in the *Daily Telegraph* of June 27th, 1930, as having said from the bench that 'there are many things in the law affecting divorce which I would like to see altered, but I despair of Parliament doing anything. The administration of justice in this division is made exceedingly difficult by the state of the law. At present it is a bundle of detached rules and scraps of legislation which are all inconsistent one with the other. There is no principle running through them. We start with an ecclesiastical garment, and then, by legislation, in a wholly scrappy way, it has been turned into a patchwork garment. Some of the patches are big, and some small, and they have all been put on without any reference to any consistent pattern.'

'The ecclesiastical garment' to which Mr. Justice Hill referred is the Canon Law, in so far as it has been allowed to influence the principles and procedure of the Divorce Court. The author's contention is that we owe the singling out of divorce, as the one and only ground for a petition for divorce, to the emphasising by Roman Catholic law of the consummation of marriage as that which is its one determining factor. But this is to reject the pure Christian principle that marriage is based on Love for the lower view of law, and the lowest view of carnal intercourse. Hence the limitation of divorce to adultery as its sole justification. And Dr. Worsley-Boden is surely right when he says that 'the true value of the new facility for women is not simply the fact that women can obtain a divorce for a single act of adultery on the part of a husband. Its true significance is that women are on an equal footing for the purpose of terminating a temperamentally and sexually (*i.e.* psychically and spiritually) unfruitful failure of a marriage, of which the act of adultery is the formal symptom and the legal ground of dissolution.'

Another evil incident to our patchwork system is that of judicial separation. This is the modern equivalent of the mediaeval divorce *a mensa et toro*. 'It is a legacy of the Canon Law that the anomalous state of separation, while the parties remain married, is easier to obtain than a dissolution which carries the right to marry again.' And 'the legal effect of a judicial separation is precisely that the separation is permanent, if the petitioner so desires, without registering in appropriate legal fact the moral dissolution which the breakdown of the marriage implies.' In a famous case, the result of the existing law was to tie a wife to a homicidal maniac, which induced Lord Birkenhead in giving judgment in the House of Lords to say: 'To some this may appear a harsh and even an inhuman result, but such is the law of England. It rests with Parliament (if and when it thinks proper) to end a state of things which, in a civilised community, and in the name of morality, imposes such an intolerable hardship on innocent men and women.'

It was a most unfortunate thing that the weighty Majority Report of the Royal Commission of 1912 was 'to be torpedoed by an obstructive Minority Report signed by two bachelors and an ecclesiastical lawyer, published as a flysheet, and broadcast far more widely than the full and considered Report of the Majority.' For the Majority aimed at such reforms

as were at once needed, and were capable of acceptance by all men of good-will, while those of the Minority, after carping at the Recommendations of the Majority, merely dealt with certain causes for a decree of nullity, and with procedure. It is not inurbane to say that the dissenting three shirked the issue on irrelevant grounds, and dislike of any breach with ecclesiastical custom. In spite, however, of the opposition of the 'Church,' Dr. Worsley-Boden has not lost heart. He looks forward to such reforms as

> 'will permit a rise in the standard and purpose of marriage, and inspire men and women so to pursue the ideal which marriage promises that they will demand divorce on the genuine and destructive grounds of failure, which will give them freedom to re-marry in the light of new knowledge and experience. This will not necessarily mean more divorces, but rather divorces on their true grounds. It is quite within the possibilities that in the long run the new knowledge will mean fewer divorces, for men and women will marry with greater knowledge of the meaning and purpose and promise of marriage, undertake the responsibilities of marriage with enlarged understanding and assurance, realise a new freedom through the substitution of love for that conception of law which is best expressed in the *tabu,* and build a much more truly Christian institution on the ashes of a discredited tradition.'

As is natural, Dr. Worsley-Boden is specially exercised in his mind about what he considers the unhappy attitude of the leaders of the Established Church to marriage reform. He understands that attitude as representing the timidity which shrinks from the unknown, as a slavish worship of the letter, and a dread of offending the powerful Anglo-Catholic group—none of them very respectable motives. It certainly blocks the way to a system more consonant with the mind of Christ, and is alienating large numbers of the most healthy minds among the laity. But if he will turn to the trend of thought among the members of the Free Churches, he will find in their more open minds that support which the Established Church is unable to give.

Dr. Worsley-Boden would welcome the wise and moderate proposals of the Royal Commission, *viz.* that in addition to adultery, divorce should be allowed for desertion, cruelty, drunkenness, insanity and imprisonment for life under a commuted death sentence, all of which were carefully defined. He would, however, add as new grounds, incompatibility and mutual consent. These were before the Commission, but were not included in their proposals, not so much apparently because they were not desirable, but because they were not practical politics. The *Reformatio Legum Ecclesiasticarum* of the sixteenth century included the former under the name of 'deadly hatred,' and this would probably have been within the law to-day had Edward VI not died inopportunely. Divorce by mutual consent is practised in a roundabout and unsatisfactory way already:

> 'The parties agree to furnish evidence of guilt which is essentially false, because, although the guilt, or the appearance of it, has occurred, it is not the true ground, but only the ground artificially provided to meet the only condition of relief provided by statute. Mutual consent, therefore, is collusive under the present law; but if mutual consent were admitted as a ground for dissolution, it would not be collusive, because in such conditions there would be no agreement to present a false case. If to-day cruelty is the true ground, but evidence of adultery is furnished by agreement, the suit becomes collusive. But if cruelty were admitted as a ground, the chance of such collusion would be reduced.'

To such absurdities are laws reduced when they proceed from a false premiss. And in the end it is true that 'when the ground of incompatibility

and mutual consent are not provided, the aim of reformers to ensure that divorce shall be obtained on the true ground is liable to defeat.'

The volume before us is enriched by a minute analysis of the piecemeal legislation of our marriage laws since 1857, and by a conspectus of the laws in all other civilised countries. This is a striking disclosure of the fact that what is being urged on us to-day has been the law for a long time in most of the nations of the world. To those tabulated there may be added for the benefit of those whom it may concern that the Orthodox Eastern Church allows divorce for adultery, danger to life, unseemly conduct, insanity. Recently, incompatibility of character and divorce by mutual agreement have been sanctioned. Moreover, an ecclesiastical divorce follows on a civil decree, on the part of the episcopal authorities.

Dr. Worsley-Boden has written a great book; great in its handling of its subject as in its tone and temper, and in the extraordinary knowledge it displays of the intricacies of our uncodified laws concerning marriage. It is a brave plea for reform on the one side, and on the other an encyclopaedia giving all that anybody is likely to want to know about 'the mischiefs of the marriage law.' W. F. GEIKIE-COBB, D.D.

CORRESPONDENCE

SIR, DIVINITY—A SCHOOLMASTER'S DILEMMA.

I read with great interest the articles on Divinity Teaching in the *Modern Churchman*. I take the IVth, Remove and Vth forms in Scripture, and have great difficulty in obtaining suitable books. In the IVth form we do *Mark*, and in the Vth the gospel set for the School Certificate Examination. (in 1934, when that will be *Mark*, I suppose we shall do the history of the Primitive Church.)

The only annotated books at all suitable that I have come across are Luce's *Mark* and *Matthew*. Unfortunately the text is Authorised Version and is not split up into reasonable paragraphs.

I consider a copy of the Revised Version New Testament necessary for each boy if we are to compare the gospels at all, and yet there is not a suitable edition in print! What is wanted is an edition with the text in paragraphs, with the verses indicated at the side and the alternative readings in the margin.

I had such an edition when I was at school (long primer, crown 8vo), and the text was printed like that of an ordinary book, *i.e.* not in two columns. To-day, there are only three editions available:—

(1) Published by the B. & F.B.S. In two columns. Verses indicated in text, no alternative readings—an uninteresting-looking form, poor print.

(2) Printed like an ordinary book, with alternative readings, but as the verses are not indicated it is extremely awkward to use. Print small.

(3) Revised version split up into verses. Print good, but what on earth is the use of a book split up into verses?

There is a similar difficulty in the choice of books for the lower forms. We use *The Short Bible*, published by Blackwell. The print is good, and the binding quite attractive, but verse is printed, not in lines as in the Revised Version but as Authorised Version verses. The two Creation stories are welded into one. The Ten Commandments are lumped into one paragraph! In the New Testament needless difficulties are made by including Peter's walk on the sea and the cursing of the fig tree. These are just a few examples of unsatisfactory editing. There are many more in the book. R.R.L.